World Habeas Corpus by Jackson, Vicki C.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 91
Issue 2 January 2006 Article 2
World Habeas Corpus
Vicki C. Jackson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation




I. WORLD HABEAS CORPUS: HABEAS CORPUS AND THE
TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
N O RM S ................................................. 307
A. The First Petition for a U.N. Writ of Habeas
Corpus: The Oatis Matter ........................... 307
1. The Petition ..................................... 309
2. Subsequent Events and Oatis' Release ............... 314
B. Advocating for World Habeas Corpus ............... 317
C. Domestic and International Supporters of World
H abeas Corpus ..................................... 324
D. Countercurrents: Anti-Habeas and Anti-Human
Rights Movements in the United States ............. 330
1. Bricker and Congress: Resisting International Human
Rights of Racial Equality .......................... 332
2. State Opposition to Federal Habeas Corpus .......... 334
E. World Habeas Corpus: Only for Others? ............ 338
II. WHERE IS "WORLD HABEAS CORPUS" TODAY? ............. 340
A. Habeas Corpus and International Human Rights
Outside the United States .......................... 341
1. Optional Protocols for Individual Complaints ........ 341
2. International Criminal Tribunals .................. 343
3. Regional Human Rights Protection ................. 344
4. National Law Incorporating International Human
Rights as Binding ................................ 346
B. Habeas Corpus in the United States ................ 346
1. Habeas Corpus and Federal Review of State Criminal
Convictions ...................................... 347
2. Habeas Corpus, Executive Detentions, and Treaty
Obligations ...................................... 348
3. Habeas Corpus and Executive Lawmaking .......... 357
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: ON HABEAS CORPUS, INDEPENDENT
JUDGING, AND INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS ................ 363
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I gratefully acknowledge the
research assistance provided by Justin Ford, Georgetown University Law Center, J.D.
expected 2006, Jason Cohen, Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. 2004, and Laura
Collier, Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. expected 2007, and thank the curators of
the collections at the Chicago Historical Society and the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University for their very helpful responses to our inquiries about the papers of Luis Kutner.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:303
Habeas corpus has played an essential part in many of the great
controversies that have marked major constitutional tensions
throughout U.S. history.' Presidential and congressional powers were
tested in the Civil War period in Ex parte Merryman2 and Ex parte
McCardle.3 In 1908, federal judicial power to prevent unconstitutional
action by state officers-of great significance to this day in assuring
the supremacy of federal law over state action-emerged in what was
technically a habeas corpus action in Ex parte Young.4 Executive
branch detentions in World War II were tested not only through
direct appeals,5 but also-and more successfully-through habeas
corpus in Ex parte Endo 6 and Duncan v. Kahanamoku.7 More recently,
habeas has been once again invoked to resolve difficult questions of
constitutional law, personal liberty, and executive and legislative
powers.8 In the last few years, habeas corpus has assumed importance
as a vehicle for litigating both U.S. constitutional claims and the
application of international legal standards to foreign nationals held
by or in the United States.9 In this same time period, U.S.
I also want to thank my co-panelists, James Pfander and Trevor Morrison, as well as my
colleagues at Georgetown and elsewhere, including Rosa Brooks, Lori Damrosch, Dan
Ernst, Joseph Margulies, Judith Resnik, David Schneiderman, John Witt, Mark Tushnet,
Carlos Vizquez, and others, for helpful comments and discussion.
1 Habeas corpus is a remedy recognized and used in a large number of nations, in
former Commonwealth nations and others. See DAVID CLARK & GERARD McCoy, THE MOST
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHT: HABEAS CORPUS IN THE COMMONWEALTH (2000) (considering
the evolution of habeas corpus in various Commonwealth countries, including in Asia,
Africa, and the Caribbean); R. J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS (1976). The
effectiveness of these remedies may, of course, vary. See, e.g., MINN. LAWYERS INT'L HUMAN
RIGHTS COMM., JUSTICE SUSPENDED: THE FAILURE OF THE HABEAS CORPUS SYSTEM IN
GUATEMALA (1990). The European Court of Human Rights, now widely regarded as the
most effective supranational human rights body, began its work in a case involving a
challenge to an assertedly unlawful detention that had, at an earlier stage, been challenged
in a domestic court through habeas corpus proceedings. See BRIN DOOLAN, LAWLESS V
IRELAND (1957-1961): THE FIRST CASE BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 52-
54, 61, 194-215 (2001).
2 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (finding that the President lacked
authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus).
3 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (upholding Congress's authority to strip the Court of
jurisdiction to hear one kind of appeal from the denial of habeas relief).
4 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908).
5 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
6 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
7 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
8 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
9 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding a
violation of a foreign-national detainee's rights under the Third Geneva Convention),
rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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engagement with what the Court has called "the world community"' 0
over legal issues has emerged as a marked point of tension.1'
Relatively unremarked in current discussions is a proposal made
more than half a century ago, in the dawn of post-World War II
human-rights based legal regimes.1 2 In 1952, an American lawyer
submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of William
N. Oatis, an Associated Press reporter being detained in
Czechoslovakia, to the Human Rights Commission of the U.N.'s
Economic and Social Council.1 3 And in 1954, the same lawyer
published the first of dozens of articles on his idea for "world habeas
corpus," or a "United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus."14
Part I of this Article describes Luis Kutner's idea for world habeas
corpus and the support and opposition it attracted in the 1950s and
1960s. Kutner's proposal was situated in a period in which the
Supreme Court's expansion of judicial enforcement of individual
rights helped feed a "states rights" resistance to independent
enforcement of national norms, a resistance that also fed opposition
to efforts to give the U.N. Charter domestic effect and protect
internationally defined human rights in U.S. courts. What is
interesting is not so much that Kutner's proposal was never realized,
but that it attracted as much support as it did in a period when the
Bricker Amendment, designed in part to insulate the Constitution
10 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
11 See, e.g., Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1225-29 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's
reliance on foreign law); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (same); id. at
347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Equally irrelevant are the practices of the 'world
community' ... .). Controversy over the use of foreign law has spilled into the political
arena. See, e.g., American Justice for America[n] Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong.
(2005); Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. (2005); Constitution
Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005); cf Douglas Jehl, Hemisphere
Conference Ends in Discord on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, at All (noting U.S.
withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol and the Bush Administration's disagreement with Latin
American countries' efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases); Neil A. Lewis, U.S.
Rejects All Support for New Court on Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at All (noting U.S.
withdrawal of support for the International Criminal Court).
12 See Vicki C. Jackson, The Early Hours of the Post-World War II Model of Constitutional
Federalism: The Warren Court and the World, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THEIR
LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAw (Harry Scheiber ed., forthcoming 2005).
13 See Luis KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS 102-09 (1962).
14 See Luis Kutner, A Proposal for a United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus and an
International Court of Human Rights, 28 TUL. L. REv. 417 (1954). Kutner was the author of
over three dozen law review articles, about two-thirds of which have titles that concern due
process or habeas corpus, and several books (some about law, some fiction or poetry). For
a partial listing, see JAMES R. ELKINS, Luis Kutner, in STRANGERS TO US ALL: LAWYERS AND
POETRY, http://www.wvu.edu/-lawfac/jelkins/lp-2001/kutner.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2005).
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from international human rights law, also found considerable
support. 15
Part II very briefly asks how far we are today from having a
remedy in the nature of world habeas corpus. The short answer is
very far indeed. But outside the United States there has been an
extraordinary movement since 1952 toward developing institutional
structures to review claims of unlawful detention at the international
and transnational levels. Within the United States, anxieties
prominendy articulated in the 1950s about allowing courts to rely on
international human rights law persist. These anxieties over the role
of the international in measuring domestic legal practices came into
bold conflict with commitments to the rule of law and to habeas
corpus as the "Great Writ" in the case of Medellin v. Dretke.16 In
Medellin, the Court was faced with a conflict between its own prior
decision in Breard v. Greene,17 and the subsequent decisions of the
International Court of Jusice (ICJ), concerning remedies for asserted
violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.',
Although resolution of that particular conflict has been postponed, 19
15 For a helpful account of how fears of the domestic effects of a draft U.N. covenant
on human rights led Senator John Bricker to introduce a proposed constitutional
amendment to limit treaty-making authority, see DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER
AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY 1-48 (1988).
16 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005).
17 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998) (indicating that asserted violations of the Vienna
Convention, if not properly raised in the state courts, could be barred from consideration
on federal habeas).
18 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. In a series of
decisions culminating in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
43 I.L.M. 581 (Judgment of Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Avena, 43 I.L.M.
581], the ICJ concluded that the Vienna Convention's provision that domestic laws "must
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
article are intended," required consideration of treaty violation claims and their effects on
underlying convictions and sentences, rejecting the proposition that such claims, if
procedurally defaulted by not being raised in the initial state court proceeding, could
properly be foreclosed under domestic law. See Avena, 43 I.L.M. 581, supra, at 612-20, 624-
25, paras. 108-14, 120-43, 153(8), (9), (11).
19 After President Bush issued a memorandum directing state courts to give effect to
the ICJ decision as a matter of comity, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari
in Medellin as improvidently granted. See 125 S. Ct. at 2090. On March 9, 2005, the United
States withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, which had signaled
the United States' consent to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact
Used in Capital Cases; Foes of the Death Penalty Cite Access to Envoys, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005,
at Al; Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2005, at A16. Although questions have been raised about whether the notice can be
effective immediately under international law, see Posting of Julian Ku to Opinio Juris,
http://awofnations.blogspot.com/2005/03/us-withdraws-from-icj-jurisdiction.html (Mar.
9, 2005, 23:13 EST), the withdrawal will at some point prevent future cases concerning U.S.
obligations under the Vienna Convention from being heard under the ICJ's compulsory
jurisdiction.
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the U.S. legal system is increasingly likely to face decisions by other
tribunals reflecting, directly or indirectly, on the legality of detentions
in the United States2 0-issues at the historic core of habeas corpus.
I
WORLD HABEAS CORPUS: HABEAS CORPUS AND THE
TRANSNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS NoRMs
The idea of "world habeas corpus" or a "United Nations writ of
habeas corpus" is, in essence, an internationalized version of the com-
mon law writ intended to vindicate the United Nations' commitment
to individual human rights. Rather than being (as I thought initially)
a fringe idea by an energetic but lone law review writer, the idea of
world habeas corpus-explained below-received support from a
number of judges, academics, and elected officials in the 1950s and
1960s. 21 While it may seem remote today that such an idea should
attract support from Supreme Court Justices and members of Con-
gress, it will be helpful to current controversies to note this earlier-
but, in fact, not so long ago-period.
A. The First Petition for a U.N. Writ of Habeas Corpus: The
Oatis Matter
Luis Kutner, creator of the concept of a world habeas corpus writ,
was a Chicago lawyer with a general practice that apparently included
20 For example, the European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme
Court have both developed jurisprudence that in most (if not all) cases prohibits
extradition of capital defendants to the United States without assurances that the death
penalty will not be sought. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1989); United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; see alsoJudge v. Canada, U.N. Human
Rights Comm., 78th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (Oct. 20, 2003)
(expressing the view that Canada violated its obligations under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by deporting a U.S. citizen facing the death penalty
to the United States without receiving assurances that the individual would not be
executed).
21 Much of the account in the first part of this paper is based on the published writ-
ings of Luis Kutner, the originator and principal advocate for the idea of world habeas
corpus. I have sought to find confirmation in other sources for those aspects of Kutner's
account described herein, including in news reports, in collections held at the Hoover
Institution, Stanford University, and the Chicago Historical Society, and also in State De-
partment records available at the National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, Maryland (hereinafter "State Department Archives"). Although complaints sent to
the U.N. Economic and Social Council were not archived before 1956 and no record could
be found in the United Nation's archives in Geneva of the habeas petition on Oatis' behalf,
see E-mail from Esther Trippel-Ngai, Chief, UNOG Registry, Records and Archives Sub-Unit
Library, United Nations Office at Geneva, to Justin Ford, Research Assistant to Vicki C.
Jackson, Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. (Apr. 8, 2005) (on file with author),
confirmation has been found, and is cited below, on several points with respect to events in
the 1950s and 1960s. More research would be needed, though, to offer a complete histori-
cal account.
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special emphasis on unjust conviction cases. 22 Between 1949 and
22 See Chi. Historical Soc'y, Biographical Sketch of Luis Kutner 1-2 (1982) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author); Ernest Katin, The Advocate as Lawmaker: Luis Kutner
and the Struggle for Due Process, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv. 397, 436-42 (1969). Kutner lived from
1908 until 1993; although some sources describe him as a graduate of the University of
Chicago, the Chicago Historical Society reports that he attended the University of Chicago
but graduated from theJohn Marshall Law School. See Chi. Historical Soc'y, supra, at 1; E-
mail from Judith Miller, Dean's Chief of Staff& Dir. for Academic Research Programs, Yale
Law Sch., to author (Apr. 12, 2005) (on file with author) (reporting that Kutner apparently
graduated in 1930 from John Marshall Law School); see also Wolfgang Saxon, Luis Kutner,
Lawyer Who Fought for Human Rights, Is Dead at 84, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1993, at B9. For more
information on Kutner's human rights work for those wrongly convicted or detained, see
Katin, supra, at 436-42; Crime Non-Existent, Trial 'Sham,' Court Frees Negro After 26 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1949, at 1; David Dressier, Luis Kutner's Crusade for Justice, CORONET, Feb.
1961, at 179; Let Habeas Be Worldwide, LIFE, Sept. 3, 1969, at 4.
In addition to his work for prisoners, Kutner is credited with the idea of a living will.
See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CiN. L. REv. 803, 808
n.23 (1993) (crediting Kutner's 1969 article as "the genesis of the living will idea"); Melvin
I. Urofsky, Leaving the Door Ajar: The Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
313, 319 & n.26 (1998) (noting that an "Illinois attorney, Luis Kutner, is given credit for
proposing a formal advance directive in 1969"). For Kutner's own writings on living wills,
see, for example, Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, a Proposal, 44 IND.
L.J. 539 (1969); Luis Kutner, The Living Will: Coping with the Historical Event of Death, 27
BAYLOR L. REv. 39 (1975). Kutner also wrote more generally on constitutional issues, see,
e.g., Luis Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51
MARQ. L. REv. 121 (1968) [hereinafter Kutner, Neglected Ninth Amendment], and to some
notice, see, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 238 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(citing Kutner's article). Kutner has been described as involved in founding Amnesty In-
ternational, see Obituary, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 3, 1993, at 3; ELKINS, supra note 14, and
as having served as "Counsul for Ecuador" and as "Counsul General for Guatemala," see
Kutner, Neglected Ninth Amendment, supra, at 121 n.*. Kutner also taught for at least one
semester at the Yale Law School. See id.; see also E-mail from Judith Miller, supra (reporting
that Kutner co-taught a course in Criminal Law and Administration in the Fall of 1948).
And Kutner is also described as a painter and a poet. See Chi. Historical Soc'y, supra, at 1;
ELKINS, supra note 14. His personal papers are at the Chicago Historical Society Library,
and his papers concerning world habeas corpus are at the Hoover Institution of Stanford
University in Palo Alto, California. Some, but not all, of the Kutner papers at the Hoover
Institution have been examined in connection with research for this paper, as have some,
but not all, archival materials from the U.S. State Department from the early 1950s.
Although evidently a man of much energy and passion, Kutner may not have been the
most effective idea entrepreneur: Available public documents, for one thing, suggest he
had a tendency to become embroiled in disputes with clients and others. For example,
Kutner was sanctioned once (by a divided court) for charging too high a fee in a criminal
case (a fee of $5,000 agreed to in advance by the client), in an opinion that otherwise
praised his career. See In re Kutner, 399 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ill. 1979); see also GabrielJ. Chin
& Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an Unreasonable Price? Limitations on Attorneys'
Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C. L. REv. 1, 39-41 (1999) (discussing In reKutner). In addition,
Kutner evidently had a dispute with at least one other client over payment of his fees. See
Chi. Historical Soc'y, supra, at 5. He was once accused of assault, see Actress Charges Assault,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1966, at 33, and was a party in several lawsuits, inter alia, against an-
other lawyer for alleged defamation, invasion of privacy, and infliction of emotional dis-
tress, see Kutner v. DeMassa, 421 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); against investment
advisers for losses suffered in the sale of securities, see Kutner v. Gofen, No. 18690, 1971
U.S. App. LEXIS 9104 (7th Cir. July 7, 1971); and as one of several defendants in a mali-
cious prosecution suit, see Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79, 80 (7th Cir. 1950). See also Katin,
supra, at 461 (describing Kutner's dramatic flair while noting that he may appear 'arrogant
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1952, he drafted papers on behalf of at least two dissidents held in
Communist-controlled countries-Joseph Cardinal Mindzsenty, sen-
tenced to life in prison by the Hungarian government,23 and William
N. Oatis, chief of the Associated Press bureau in Prague, Czechoslova-
kia 24-towards the idea of seeking habeas corpus relief from the
United Nations to secure their release. Papers were actually submit-
ted only in the Oatis case, which I describe below.
1. The Petition
Kutner prepared a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to chal-
lenge Oatis's detention, styled "United Nations, Ex Rel., Luis Kutner,
For and on Behalf of William N. Oatis, Petitioner, v. Czechoslovakia,
Respondent-Petition of Luis Kutner For and on Behalf of William N.
Oatis, For a United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus," addressed to the
General Assembly of the United Nations; he delivered it in early May
1952 to the U.N. Human Rights Commission.2 5 Simultaneously, Kut-
and egoistic," and has a tendency when championing a client or a cause to become "ob-
sessed with the task, assuming a stance of self-righteousness"). (Katin appears to have
served for a time as an assistant to Kutner. See, e.g., Luis Kutner, World Habeas Corpus:
Ombudsman for Mankind, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv. 352, 352 n.* (1970) [hereinafter Kutner,
Ombudsman].)
23 See Luis KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS: A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF HABEAS COP-PUS AND THE UNITED NATIONS WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 31-32
(1957). Kutner attributes his developing the idea of a United Nations writ of habeas
corpus to Samuel Cardinal Strich's request in 1949 that Kutner devise some form of legal
redress for Cardinal Mindzsenty. See Kutner, supra note 14, at 418 n.6. A copy of Kutner's
brief on behalf of Mindzsenty is reproduced as Appendix IV to KUTNER, supra. Despite
what Kutner reports as favorable responses to the brief he drafted on Cardinal Mindz-
senty's behalf, "the proposal was not pressed for fear of less than complete success." Kut-
ner, supra note 14, at 418 n.6.
24 See KUTNER, supra note 23, app. V at 70-71. (Kutner also cryptically alludes to ef-
forts on behalf of another American, Robert Vogeler, held in Czechoslovakia. Id. at
32-33.) It is interesting, in light of current issues concerning interrogation of prisoners, to
note Oatis' account of his false confession to espionage. See William N. Oatis, Why I Con-
fessed, LIFE, Sept. 21, 1953, at 131 (explaining how sleep deprivation and forced standing
led to the false confession). Oatis was later exonerated by the Czechs, first in the 1960s by
Alexander Dubcek's reformist government (a decision reversed after the Soviet takeover),
and then again in 1990. See Raynor Pike, AP Reporter William Oatis Dies, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 16, 1997, available at http://www.oatis.com/memorial/obit.html.
25 See KUTNER, supra note 23, app. V at 70, 80. (The actual petition is reproduced in
appendix V to this book and in the Congressional Record, see 98 CONG. REc. 4,957-62
(1952).) Massachusetts Republican Representative Edith Nourse Rogers announced the
filing. See 98 CONG. REC. 4,957 (1952) (statement of Rep. Rogers) ("[A] petition for a
United Nations writ of habeas corpus to free William N. Oatis, Associated Press correspon-
dent, will be filed today with the Human Rights Commission in New York."); U.N. to Be
Asked to Seek World Court Writ on Oatis, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1952, at 5; see also 98 CONG. REC.
4,957 (1952) (statement of Rep. Rogers) (crediting Kutner, "a prominent Chicago attor-
ney," with the preparation of the petition). Rogers served in the House of Representatives
from 1925 until 1960. See Rogers, Edith Nourse, (1881-1960), Biographical Directory of
the United States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=
R000392 (last visited Dec. 14, 2005). She was evidently a strong advocate for Oatis, refer-
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ner presented to the "United States Members of the Economic and
Social Council" a request for the "United States [to] Join in as Party-
Movant in the Presenting, Filing, and Prosecution of the Petition for a
United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus for William N. Oatis, a Citizen
of the United States," 26 reciting that Oatis was a citizen of the United
States and that the United States was a signatory to the U.N. Charter.
(I will refer to these documents together as "the petition.")
The petition asserted that the Czechoslovakian government vio-
lated Oatis's rights under the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR) by arbitrarily arresting Oatis, denying
him the right to see or communicate with his consul, and denying the
American Embassy's request that it be permitted to see Oatis.2 7 The
petition further accused the Czechoslovakian government of subject-
ing Oatis to "repeated inhuman methods of cruelty and torture, de-
priving him of his free will, reducing his mental state to that of a
somnambulistic automaton, toward the end of compelling [him] to
plead guilty to the alleged offenses which he did not commit and of
which respondent was well aware. '28 The petition asserted that the
Czechoslovakian government engineered a kangaroo trial with a gov-
ring in her remarks to an earlier introduced resolution to sever diplomatic relations with
Czechoslovakia if Oatis were not released (that did not pass) and a modified resolution
(that did pass) threatening reductions in trade. See 98 CONG. REC. 4,957 (1952).
It is doubtful that Kutner was asked by either Oatis or his family to prepare the peti-
tion. See KUTNER, supra note 13, at 103 (stating that Lou Shainmark, "Managing Editor of
the Chicago Herald-American, a member of the Hearst chain . . . , suggested to the author
that action be taken to focalize attention on Mr. Oatis' plight"); id. app. X at 252 (asserting
in the 1952 petition that "[u]nder the basic law of habeas corpus a petition in [sic] behalf
of William Oatis can be filed by anyone, be it friend or a kin, setting up the complaining
facts"). It seems likely that Oatis's wife had rejected suggestions to pursue a habeas corpus
remedy. See Letter from Laurabelle Z. Oatis to Harold Vedeler, Officer in Charge, Polish,
Baltic and Czechoslovak Affairs, U.S. State Dep't (Dec. 4, 1951) (on file in the State De-
partment Archives on William N. Oatis) (indicating that she had been approached by the
"I.N.S."-possibly referring to the International News Service-about a "habeas corpus
gimmick" that she would not participate in); Letter from Harold C. Vedeler, Officer in
Charge, Polish, Baltic and Czechoslovak Affairs, U.S. State Dep't, to Mrs. William N. Oatis
(Dec. 21, 1951) (on file in the State Department Archives on William N. Oatis) (stating
that "[t]he suggestions of I.N.S. were discussed with Associated Presss representatives and
the general consensus was that it would not assist in efforts to free your husband"). Wil-
liam Randolph Hearst helped create the International News Service, see Hearst, William
Randolph, MSN ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761577
497/HearstWilliamRandolph.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2005), which merged with
United Press to become United Press International in 1959, see Hearst, KETUPA.NET MEDIA
PROFILES, http://www.ketupa.net/hearst2.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2005). It seems likely
that Mrs. Oatis's reference to the I.N.S.-backed "habeas gimmick" reflects what Kutner de-
scribed as Lou Shainmark's suggestion.
26 KUTNER, supra note 23, app. V at 70.
27 Id. But cf Kutner, supra note 14, at 420 (noting that the UDHR was "not an en-
forceable treaty with binding obligations").
28 KUTNER, supra note 23, app. V at 71. Czechoslovakia accused Oatis of "activities
hostile to the state," "gathering and disseminating" secrets, and "spreading malicious infor-
mation regarding the Czech state through illegal news organs." Id.
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ernment-appointed defense counsel who cooperated in obtaining a
false guilty plea from Oatis as he was held incommunicado. 29
The petition anticipated many of the arguments Kutner was later
to advance in his academic writing. For example, the petition argued
that the General Assembly had jurisdiction under Articles 55 and 56
of the U.N. Charter, which obligated the signatory powers to consider
implementation of human rights an "international concern and a spe-
cial responsibility of the United Nations. ' 30 Moreover, the petition
claimed that the General Assembly had "inherent power to create the
methods, vehicles, or organs to carry out the objects and purposes of
the" United Nations, including those of Charter Article I, "'promoting
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms to all.' "31 The
petition also invoked the authority of the Economic and Social Coun-
cil under Charter Articles 62 and 68, authorizing the Council to make
recommendations and set up commissions for the promotion and
protection of human rights. 32
Apart from the Charter-based arguments, the petition argued in
the alternative that the General Assembly "makes policies and is the
parliament of the world" and has the responsibility of recommending
any action to execute its purposes to preserve human rights; the As-
sembly, Kutner suggested, was the "sole judge of its own competence"
to assume 'jurisdictional responsibility to enforce separate and collec-
tive human rights under the Charter. ' 33 Kutner also raised the possi-
bility of invoking the jurisdiction of the ICJ, noting that Article 96 of
the Charter authorizes the General Assembly to request an advisory
opinion from that court "'on any legal question.' "34 Although the
29 See id.
30 Id. app. V at 72.
31 Id. The State Department vigorously contested Kutner's claim that the General
Assembly had any such power, arguing that the General Assembly had power only to de-
bate and make recommendations but not to issue orders to any country. See Letter from
Jack K. McFall, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of State, to Sen. Everett M. Dirksen 1-2 (May 27,
1952) (on file in the Kumer Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University).
32 See KUTNER, supra note 23, app. V at 73 (citing U.N. Charter arts. 62, 68).
33 Id.
34 Id. app. V at 74 (also referencing the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction). Anticipating
concern that the relief he sought would be regarded as an unjustified intervention into
domestic sovereignty (under U.N. Charter article 2(7), the so-called "domestic jurisdic-
tion" clause, which states in part that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of any state"), Kutner invoked the provisions of Article 104 of the Char-
ter, authorizing the United Nations to "'enjoy in the territory of each of its members such
legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and fulfillment of its
purpose."' Id. His essential argument was that human rights violations were not protected
by the domestic jurisdiction clause, because such violations were not merely of domestic
concern, but were also of concern to the community of nations committed to the basic




arguments that the General Assembly's jurisdiction extended to coer-
cive orders to support U.N. purposes went well beyond generally ac-
cepted interpretations of the U.N. Charter,35 Kutner's argument that
the General Assembly could refer a matter to the ICJ for an advisory
opinion on whether a state's action violated international law appears
to have been well-founded, 36 though it was not repeated in the formal
prayer for relief at the end of the petition.
Anticipating objections that the Charter did not create individual
rights, Kutner argued that it was a legally binding document under
which the individual human being is entitled to protection: "The
Charter being cosmopolitical in nature requires a cosmojudicial writ
for all humans on this globe. '3 7 Failure to provide "direct legal ac-
tion" would, he argued, "impair... the intent, purpose, and principle
of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." 38
Moreover, "[t]ribunals and organs within the structure of the Char-
ter" could, he urged, act as "a human-rights court" to remedy human
rights violations.39 According to Kutner's petition, Czechoslovakia, a
signatory to the U.N. Charter, had violated Oatis's human rights and
its "sovereign integrity" should not allow it to engage in human rights
violations, even within its own borders.40
Asserting that Oatis had no other available remedy, the petition
argued that Oatis "has only the remedy of habeas corpus remaining
under his rights as a citizen of a signatory state and as a subject in the
world community under the Declaration of Human Rights." 4 1 Kut-
ner's focus on the absence of other available remedies presumably
reflected a U.S. lawyer's familiarity with requirements for exhaustion
of available state remedies in habeas corpus in the United States.42
35 See, e.g., supra note 31.
36 See U.N. Charter art. 96. The ICJ has on occasion issued advisory opinions, in re-
sponse to referrals from the General Assembly, see, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Con-
struction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion of July 9,
2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm, and
other authorized organs, including the Security Council, see Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Nothwithstand-
ing Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21)
(stating, inter alia, that South Africa's racial apartheid in Namibia "constitute[s] a denial of
fundamental human rights ... [which the Court views as a] flagrant violation of the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter").
37 KUTNER, supra note 23, app. V at 76.
38 Id. app. V at 75.
39 Id.
40 See id. app. V at 74-75.
41 Id. app. V at 75.
42 For cases of that era discussing the exhaustion of remedies requirement for federal
habeas petitions, see, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953); Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519, 521 (1952); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950). Exhaustion of state remedies is
still required today. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000).
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The petition sought several forms of relief, asking that the Gen-
eral Assembly order Czechoslovakia to show cause for Oatis's deten-
tion and (presumably if the government continued to detain Oatis)
that the matter be "referred to an appropriate organ or assigned to
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] to render an
advisory opinion." 43 The petition also asked that the ICJ or other tri-
bunal seek assistance from the Human Rights Commission "to assist in
the mobilization of all the facts" and that it issue an order requiring
that Oatis be produced in open court to test the legality of his deten-
tion.44 An ICJ decision, Kutner argued, could be enforced by the Se-
curity Council:4 5 In possible tension with his suggestion that the
advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ be invoked, he argued that "realistic
effective methods" to enforce its judgment included either economic
or military means, the cessation of diplomatic relations, and, as a last
resort, "the power of world opinion. '46
For Kutner, recognition of a U.N. writ of habeas corpus would
contribute to the development of international law and to the institu-
tional capacities of the United Nations itself. Without a U.N. writ of
habeas corpus to test the legality of detentions, he argued, "the world
[would] never know whether international substantive law is an illu-
sion or whether it is a reality that will preserve the liberty of an individ-
ual. '47 As a matter of building institutional capacity, Kutner urged the
United Nations to "seize its first great occasion to affirm its power of
judicial review when it is alleged under oath that a human being has
been wrongfully deprived of his human rights and human dignity by a
nation not his own."48 Other alternatives, Kutner asserted, were inade-
quate: "Constrained diplomacy, the payments of ransom, timidity to
call a signatory state to the bar of international justice violates the
concept of international due process. What counts alone is the just
4-1 KUTNER, supra note 23, app. V at 76.
44 Id. Kutner also argued that the age and importance of the writ of habeas corpus
supported its availability here as a method to test the legality of Oatis's detention and that
the ICJ's earlier cases on inter-state disputes supported its authority to hear this dispute.
Id. app. V at 75-77. Kutner also invoked the tentative draft Covenant of Human Rights
concerning fair criminal process to support the propriety of a U.N. writ of habeas corpus.
Id. app. V at 77-78.
45 Id. app. V at 76.
46 Id. app. V at 75. In his reliance on the power of world opinion to give effect to a
judgment, Kutner in some respects anticipated the "shaming" strategies of modern human
rights activists. See generally ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (discussing the development of the human rights movement in
the second half of the twentieth century).
47 KUTNER, supra note 23, app. V at 78.
48 Id. app. V at 79.
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action of the United Nations. '49 Failure to so act, he argued, would
lead to a decline in the United Nations' world influence. 50
2. Subsequent Events and Oatis' Release
The U.N. Human Rights Commission received the petition in
May 1952 and, in accordance with procedures established by the U.N.
Economic and Social Council, forwarded it to the government of
Czechoslovakia. 51  Kutner also delivered the petition to Eleanor
Roosevelt at the United Nations.5 2 Yet Kutner's petition did not pro-
cure any other action from any organ of the United Nations (apart
from the action of the Human Rights Commission in forwarding the
petition to Czechoslovakia). No U.N. writ of habeas corpus, or order
to show cause, ever issued, nor did any other official U.N. or U.S. ac-
tion take up any of Kutner's suggestions. 53
Indeed, Kutner's efforts to involve the United States in sponsor-
ing the petition were fruitless (and evoked arguments from the State
Department opposing its legal basis),54 leading him to seek assistance
49 Id.
50 See id.
51 According to Kutner, he was advised on May 16, 1952 that the petition had been
sent to Czechoslavkia. See id. at 33. That the petition was forwarded to the Czechoslovak
government is confirmed by State Department correspondence. See Letter from Ben H.
Brown, Jr., Acting Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of State, to Sen. Everett M. Dirksen (Sept. 15,
1952) (on file in the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University);
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to Luis Kutner (Sept.
19, 1952) (on file in the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University).
The State Department letters each emphasized that the Human Rights Commission "has
no power to take any action in regard to any complaint concerning human rights." Id.
52 See Letter from Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Representative in the Human Rights
Comm'n, U.S. Mission to the U.N., to Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Assistant Sec'y of State,
U.S. Dep't of State (May 12, 1952) (on file in the State Department Archives on William N.
Oatis) (reporting that Luis Kutner handed her some papers on May 9, 1952 at the United
Nations, including what she described as a letter from Kutner, a Petition to the General
Assembly, and a Petition to the Economic and Social Council, each listed as an enclosure
to her letter).
53 See Luis Kutner & Beverly May Carl, An International Writ of Habeas Corpus: Protection
of Personal Liberty in a World of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 22 U. Prrr. L. REv. 469, 539
(1961) (noting that the Oatis case highlighted the defects of the existing procedures).
54 See Letter from Jack K. McFall to Sen. Everett M. Dirksen, supra note 31, at 1-2
(detailing objections to Kutner's proposal as not respecting the limitations of the U.N.
Charter or the General Assembly's lack of authority to issue orders, and stating that "this
Government has not found it possible to take any official action on [Kutner's] proposal in
the United Nations"); Letter from Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Representative in the
Human Rights Comm'n, U.S. Mission to the U.N., to Luis Kutner 1 (May 29, 1952) (on file
in the Kumer Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) (reporting that she
was advised by the State Department that the "proposal does not take account of the consti-
tutional powers and limitations of the United Nations organs which would be called upon
to act"); Letter fromJack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to Luis Kutner
1 (copy date-stamped July 25, 1952) (on file in the State Department Archives on William
N. Oatis) (asserting that there is no "legal basis upon which the United Nations or the
International Court of Justice could issue a writ of habeas corpus for Mr. Oatis ... [be-
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from members of Congress 55 and from other countries. 56 By May
1953, there had been no action on the Oatis petition, either in the
form of U.S. willingness to sponsor the petition or its claims for relief
or by U.N. organs. At that time, according to Kutner, the then-ambas-
sador from the Dominican Republic, Rafael Trujillo, 57 offered
through an aide to present a resolution to the U.N. General Assem-
bly.58 The plan, according to Kutner, was for the Dominican Republic
to seek to intervene to become the party-movant in prosecuting the
cause] issuance and execution of such a writ is an exercise of a sovereign power of govern-
ment ... [and] the United Nations is not a superstate or a world government ... [and]
does not have sovereign powers"). Tate went on to explain that the ICJ's compulsory juris-
diction was unavailable because Czechoslovakia had not accepted the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the ICJ and was unlikely to accept it on an ad hoc basis. See Letter from Jack B. Tate
to Luis Kutner, supra, at 1. Implicitly conceding that the General Assembly could request
that the ICJ give an advisory opinion, Tate asserted that such an opinion "would not pro-
vide a basis for the issuance of an order ... in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at
2. In response to Kutner's interpretation of Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter, the
letter relied on the then-recent California Supreme Court decision in Sei Fujii v. California,
242 P.2d 617, 620-21 (Cal. 1952), holding that the language in Articles 55 and 56 was not
self-executing. Letter from Jack B. Tate to Luis Kutner, supra, at 2.
55 Senator Everett Dirksen, for example, queried the State Department about its posi-
tion on Luis Kutner's proposal, in both May and August of 1952. See Letter from Jack K.
McFall to Sen. Everett M. Dirksen, supra note 31, at 1; Letter from Ben H. Brown, Jr. to
Sen. Everett M. Dirksen, supra note 51. In response, the State Department focused on the
legal barriers to the entry of coercive orders by U.N. bodies. See Letter fromJack M. McFall
to Sen. Everett M. Dirksen, supra note 31, at 1-2. According to the State Department, "the
legal basis for [Kutner's petition] appeared very doubtful," because the General Assembly
does not have "the power to issue 'orders' of any kind to any Member." Id. at 1. The
General Assembly has authority only to make recommendations and therefore lacked au-
thority to order Czechoslovakia to show cause for detaining Oatis. Id. at 1-2. As in Jack
Tate's letter to Kutner, see supra note 54, McFall explained to Senator Dirksen that even if
the General Assembly referred the matter to the ICJ, that court could issue only an advisory
opinion and could not require the production of Oatis. Letter from Jack M. McFall to Sen.
Everett M. Dirksen, supra note 31, at 2. Ultimately, the letter asserted, Kutner's proposal
"unfortunately fails to take account of the actual scope of authority of United Nations
bodies." Id. at 3. Although Kutner acknowledged the State Department's objections, he
also asserted that the great Austrian judge and legal scholar Hans Kelsen, by then recog-
nized as an authority on the United Nations due to his 1951 book, The Law of the United
Nations, expressed the view that under Article 56 of the U.N. Charter such a procedure was
permissible. See KUTNER, supra note 23, at 33.
56 See KUTNER, supra note 23, at 33-34.
57 Trujillo, it should be noted, had been President of the Dominican Republic. See
ROBERT D. CRASSWELLER, TRUJILLO: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF A CARIBBEAN DICTATOR 87-121
(1966). In 1952 he had his brother installed in the presidency while he became Com-
mander-in-Chief of the military forces and Ambassador-at-Large to the United Nations. See
id. at 261, 268. Trujillo is widely regarded as a dictator. See, e.g., id. In a later law review
article, Kumer specifically noted "the use of intimidation and terror as political weapons"
by the Dominican Republic. See Luis Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: A Legal Absolute for Sur-
vival, 39 U. DETROIT L.J. 279, 310 (1962).
58 See KUTNER, supra note 23, at 33; see also Letter from Luis Kutner to Gen. Manuel de
Moya, Dom. Rep. Delegation to the U.N. I (Mar. 2, 1953) (on file in the Kumer Archives at
the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) (exclaiming "over the pending dramatic and
effective step to be taken by His Excellency" and indicating that Rep. John Beamer and
Rep. Edith Nourse Rogers were supportive of the anticipated efforts of the Ambassador).
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petition and seeking Oatis's discharge from wrongful incarceration.59
The proposed resolution was drafted to ask the General Assembly to
refer the Oatis petition to the ICJ for an advisory opinion, as well as
for other relief.60 According to Kutner, the Dominican Republic's
government notified the U.S. government of the draft resolution, and,
at the request of the U.S. State Department, delayed introduction of
the resolution by thirty days.61
Oatis was released from custody in May 1953 (three weeks into
this period, according to Kutner). 62 Whether Kutner's petition con-
tributed to his release is at best unclear, although Kutner has asserted
that it may have played a role. 63 Gatis's imprisonment was the subject
of public concern and resolutions by other organizations as well. 64
State Department records, to the extent I have been able to review
them, suggest that diplomatic negotations and agreements relating,
for example, to allowing Czechoslovakian exports to the United States
and permitting resumption of Czechoslovakian civil aircraft flights
over West Germany, played a critical role, and that a petition to the
Czechoslovakian government for commutation of sentence filed by
59 See KUTNER, supra note 23, app. VI at 81-82.
60 Id.; KUTNER, supra note 13, app. XII at 263-65 (reproducing a draft resolution,
beginning, "Resolution by Raphael Leonidas Trujillo, Ambassador at Large and Chief of
the Dominican Republic Delegation of the United Nations relating to the petition of Luis
Kutner for a United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus for and on behalf of William N.
Oatis . . .").
61 See KUTNER, supra note 23, at 33-34.
62 See id. at 33-34; KUTNER, supra note 13, at 106.
63 See id. at 106-07 ("Parties may dispute as to the part played in the release of Mr.
Oatis by the then pending steps toward a showdown in the United Nations. Suffice it to say
that the author and many other persons believe that the pressures, which mounted stead-
ily, for a United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus were effective in keeping Oatis' case
before the Conscience of Mankind, and in finally securing his release.... [T]he action of
Czechoslovakia testified . . . to totalitarian unwillingness to risk its case before a Bar of
International Justice."). But see infra, text at note 65; cf. Pike, supra note 24 (reporting that
the Czech government said it released Oatis because of a "poignant plea" by his wife).
64 See, e.g., Letter to Dean G. Acheson, U.S. Sec'y of State, from Dana Converse
Backus, Chairman, Comm. on Int'l Law, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York (Oct. 19,
1951) (on file in the State Department Archives on William N. Oatis) (transmitting resolu-
tions and a report urging the United States to continue to work through the United Na-
tions to secure Oatis's release, and further urging "appropriate action to secure
international acceptance of basic guarantees for the defense of accused persons"). Like
Kutner's arguments, this report relied on Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter to support its
conclusion that the General Assembly has power within the field of human rights to "in-
quire into the Oatis case." COMM. ON INT'L LAW, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, REPORT ON THE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT OF WILLIAM N. OATIS BY THE CZECHOSLO-
VAK GOVERNMENT 9 (1951). Unlike Kutner's early arguments, the Report recognized that
General Assembly decisions "are recommendations only," urging nonetheless that exercis-
ing the power of inquiry and recommendation "would be a useful restraint on the Czecho-
slovakian position," which might "have a deterrent effect on future Communist action" and
improve Oatis' treatment during his imprisonment. Id. at 9-10.
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Oatis' spouse provided the legal occasion for his release. 65 Whatever
role Kutner's petition did or did not play in building pressure for
Oatis's release, the petition clearly played a role in Kutner's future
efforts to spread the idea of world habeas corpus.
B. Advocating for World Habeas Corpus
As he explained in a letter to the Secretary of State shortly after
submitting the Oatis petition, Kutner's legal experience was to "have
improvised legal remedies time and time again to free men wrongfully
imprisoned," proceeding "on the premise that for every wrong there
must be a remedy,"66 echoing a famous passage in Marbury v.
Madison.67 Even after Oatis was freed, Kutner energetically advoca-
cated for the idea of world habeas corpus. In 1954, the Tulane Law
Review published the first of many articles by Kutner detailing his pro-
posal for world habeas corpus, 6 3 and for an international court to
hear claims of unlawful detention and issue such writs. 69 The U.N.
Charter, Kutner argued, created a legal obligation on the part of mem-
ber states "to respect and observe human rights and fundamental free-
doms 'for all. ' ' 70  Drawing on contemporary sources, he strongly
urged the link between protection of human rights and the preserva-
tion of world peace.71 The Charter, according to Kutner, was a bind-
65 See, e.g., Memorandum from Ambassador G. Wadsworth & Nat B. King, Counselor
of Embassy, Am. Embassy in Prague, to Dr. Gertrude Sekaninova-Cakrtova, Acting Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Czechoslovakia 2-3 (April 13, 1953) (on file in the State Department
Archives on William N. Oatis) (informing the Czech goverment of seven "assurances" from
the U.S. government of "actions which, in event of favorable Czechoslovak action on Mrs.
Oatis' pending petition [for a pardon or commutation of her husband's sentence], it
would take simultaneously with, or so soon as possible immediately after, commutation of
Mr. Oatis' sentence to expulsion"); Incoming Telegram from Ambassador Wadsworth to
the Sec'y of State (May 15, 1953) (providing an English translation of President
Zapotocky's message, indicating that Mrs. Oatis's petition of November 1952 to pardon
Oatis from serving the uncompleted part of his sentence was being granted and would be
announced the following morning).
66 Letter from Luis Kutner to Dean Acheson, U.S. Sec'y of State I (May 15, 1952) (on
file in the State Department Archives on William N. Oatis). In this letter Kutner also urged
that "one of the best ways to stop international kidnapping under the sham pretense of law
is to establish legal techniques that will bring a sovereign signatory state to the Bar of
Justice in the established international tribunal." Id. at 3.
67 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
68 See Kutner, supra note 14.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 418 (quoting or referencing U.N. Charter arts. 1, 13, 55, 56, and 76). Kutner
cited several leading scholars of international law to support the proposition that the U.N.
Charter creates legal obligations. See id. at 418 n.7 (citing H. L UTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145-54 (1950); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS
(1952); Myres S. McDougal & Gertrude C.K. Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Com-
munity: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 490
(1949)).
71 See Kutner, supra note 14, at 423 (quoting a 1953 address by the U.S. delegate to
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights).
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ing document premised on the need to protect the human rights
principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 72
Yet, he observed, the recognition of these human rights had not yet
been accompanied by "effective methods for guaranteeing that obliga-
tions will be observed. '7 3
Without enforceable law, Kutner asserted, civilized nations can-
not secure free societies.7 4 Insisting on the need to provide proce-
dures for individual complaints, Kutner argued that the U.N. Charter
should be interpreted "in accord with the principle of effectiveness, as
allowing individuals to petition the organization for redress of denials
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. '' 75 Without individuals'
ability to vindicate their own rights, the guarantee of respect for
human rights so essential to the goals of the United Nations could not
be achieved: "The principle that individuals should be allowed to peti-
tion the United Nations for effective action with regard to protecting
their human rights is . . .a deeply rooted consequence of effective
interpretation. '76 In so arguing, Kutner drew on the traditions of U.S.
constitutionalism to emphasize the importance of individual com-
plaint and redress to promote the rule of law.7 7
Responding to a potential legal objection, Kutner explained why
the domestic jurisdiction clause, found in Article 2 of the U.N. Char-
ter,78 did not preclude intervention on human rights issues.79 Al-
72 See id. at 418-20.
73 Id. at 424.
74 See KUTNER, supra note 23, at 34.
75 Kutner, supra note 14, at 427. Kutner placed special weight on Articles 55 and 56
of the U.N. Charter in developing his argument. See, e.g., KUTNER, supra note 23, at 33,
app. V at 73. Article 55 provides in part:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,
the United Nations shall promote:
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
U.N. Charter art. 55. Article 56 states that "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint
and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the pur-
poses set forth in Article 55." Id. art. 56.
76 Kutner, supra note 14, at 428.
77 See id. at 428-29; supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. On Kutner's prior
experience using the writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of detentions within the
United States, see Katin, supra note 22, at 436-42. On the significance of individual access
to courts in the development of effective transnational law in Europe, see Laurence R.
Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107
YALE L.J. 273, 291-92, 294-97 (1997) (noting significance of the capacity for review of
individual complaints in the European Court of Human Rights and the ability of national
courts to invoke the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in concrete cases).
78 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7; supra note 34.
79 See Kutner, supra note 14, at 429-30.
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though Article 2(7) states that nothing authorizes the United Nations
to intervene "'in matters which are essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of any state,"' 80 he argued that the term "essentially" con-
templated a meaning dependent on the future development of
international relations.8' Human rights violations are not purely do-
mestic affairs, because "denials of human rights in one country have
consequences which affect the affairs and interests of other coun-
tries."82 International relations, in other words, had "developed to the
point where 'no people can be secure unless all people are secure,'
and thus the domestic jurisdiction clause did not prohibit U.N. action
to protect human rights implicitly guaranteed by the Charter.8 3
Turning to particular human rights, Kutner argued that freedom
from arbitrary arrest is of utmost importance, because arbitrary arrest
"has been the cornerstone of ancient tyrannies and modern totalitar-
ian regimes."8 4 A legal remedy, he urged, must be developed, and "no
single legal remedy has played a greater role in protecting the free-
dom of individuals from arbitrary arrest than the writ of habeas
corpus."8 5 He noted that "[c]ustoms and principles of international
law" would provide the precedent for a U.N. habeas corpus proce-
dure, habeas corpus being "widespread in civilized nations"86 and
analogous to the procedures used for extradition from one state to
another.8 7 Kutner also argued that the idea of humanitarian interven-
80 Id. at 429 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7).
81 See id. at 429-30.
82 Id. at 430; see also Kutner & Carl, supra note 53, at 538 (noting that the General
Assembly took 'jurisdiction" over South Africa's discriminatory treatment of Indian immi-
grants, notwithstanding objections based on the Charter's domestic jurisdiction clause).
Carol Anderson argues that the U.S. government insisted on including the domestic juris-
diction clause in the U.N. Charter in order to protect the United States from having to give
human rights domestic effects. See CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 44-50 (2003). From
this perspective, Kutner's efforts to persuade the State Department to his views in the 1950s
appear perhaps even more utopian.
83 See Kutner, supra note 14, at 430 (quoting McDougal & Leighton, supra note 70, at
494).
84 Id. at 430-31. Kutner drew on a then-recent article by Professor Chafee, which
argued that the writ of habeas corpus was the most important human right in the U.S.
Constitution and that it would have been better for the United Nations to adopt a writ of
habeas corpus than the many broad rights included in the draft human rights convention.
Id. at 431 n.63 (citing Zechariah Chafee,Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitu-
tion, 32 B.U. L. REV. 143 (1952)).
85 Id. at 431. He elsewhere argued that the General Assembly had the power itself to
act on an individual petition for habeas corpus, to create or designate an organ for taking
evidence, or to refer the matter to the International Court ofJustice for an advisory opin-
ion. See KUTNER, supra note 13, app. II at 211, 215.
86 Kutner, supra note 14, at 436. For an extensive and detailed survey of habeas
corpus and analogous protections against unlawful detention around the world, see Kutner
& Carl, supra note 53, at 474-535.
87 See Kutner, supra note 14, at 437-38.
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tion, developed prior to the Charter, would support a "right of inter-
vention where a State treats its own nationals so as to shock the
conscience of mankind."88
Kutner, in 1954, urged the United Nations to enact its equivalent
to the British Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, requiring that "an appropri-
ate judicial organ issue, as a matter of right, an order to show cause
why the writ should not issue where it appears that the detention is
without cause or for causes which would shock the conscience of man-
kind."8' 9 A proper return to a show cause order could indicate the
availability of domestic remedies or other reasons the writ should not
issue,90 but it was essential that the prisoner have a right to be heard
and that where appropriate there be a mechanism for factfinding
about the legality of the detention. 91 The habeas corpus procedures
themselves would not require forceful compulsion, but if a state re-
fused to deliver a prisoner to the United Nations, it would raise a
question of sanctions.92 As a mechanism to provide a hearing to de-
termine rights under a U.N. writ of habeas corpus, Kutner initially
proposed that the United Nations establish an International Court of
Human Rights with authority to hear matters concerning basic human
rights violations that "shock the conscience of mankind" and issue
writs of habeas corpus.93 Once established, the U.N. writ of habeas
corpus would, Kutner claimed, quoting Chafee, "'erect a world-wide
barrier against the knock on the door at 3 A.M,' and the paralyzing
fear resulting from the existence of that fact."94
Kutner modified his proposal over time. By 1957 he argued for a
United Nations Court of Habeas Corpus (rather than a Human Rights
Court) and a United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus. 95 In 1958, he
persuaded Representative John V. Beamer, an Indiana Republican, to
introduce a concurrent resolution to provide federal support to the
88 See id. at 433.
89 Id. at 435.
90 See id.
91 See id. at 434-35; Kutner & Carl, supra note 53, at 478, 488-500 (emphasizing how
remedies like habeas corpus secure a hearing and provide for factfinding to prevent
wrongful detentions).
92 See Kutner, supra note 14, at 437.
93 Id. at 439. Kutner proposed a new standing court, because he had concluded that,
given the need for a state-party or U.N. organ to invoke the ICJ's jurisdiction, and the fact
that the procedures and length of proceedings before the ICJ would create a great "time
lag between the wrong and the judgment," the ICJ was impracticable for effective protec-
tion against unlawful detention. Id. at 439 nn.92-93. Kutner also contemplated that the
jurisdiction of his proposed court over individual rights could expand as international law
came to protect more individual rights. See id. at 439 n.95.
94 Id. at 440; see also supra note 84.
95 See KUTNER, supra note 23, at 26-34, 46-50. Kutner appeared at this time, in 1957,
to contemplate that the General Assembly could create the court through its existing pow-
ers. See id. at 10 (arguing that the General Assembly possesses power to establish "subsidi-
ary organs" needed to perform its functions).
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Commission for International Due Process (a nonprofit entity Kutner
had established) to "draft ... a proposed world treaty-statute" to pro-
vide for an International Court of Habeas Corpus.9 6 In his 1962 book,
Kutner included a draft of a proposed "treaty-statute" for such an in-
ternational court, which provided as well for a regional system of in-
termediate international courts to hear habeas corpus petitions.9 7
The breadth of his idea, and the persistence of his defense, is dis-
played throughout many writings, all of which insist on the primacy of
habeas corpus as a remedy for unlawful detention.98
An interesting argument Kutner developed was that, given the
diversity of legal cultures and practices, international law could not
realistically impose "immediately perfect protection of all individual
rights."9 9 In several articles, Kutner linked the diversity of legal cul-
tures to his proposal to divide the world into geographic circuits,
which would "correspond approximately to the main diversities in le-
gal traditions, culture, religion and history,"' 0 0 and be staffed by
"[r]egional world attorneys general" and assisted by "amici curiae"
who would "prosecute petitions for the writ."10 1 Kutner envisioned
regional circuit courts composed of seven judges, at least four of
whom must be nationals of states within the region-a feature of the
"compromise" he saw as essential to obtaining broad participation by
many countries. 10 2 Appeals would lie from the regional courts to an
96 See H.R. Con. Res. 318, 85th Cong. § 7 (1958); Letter from Rep.John V. Beamer to
All Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives (May 14, 1958)
(on file in the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University). The
proposed resolution, never adopted, is also reproduced in KUTNER, supra note 13, app. I at
201. On Beamer, see infra note 129.
97 See KUTNER, supra note 13, app. XIII at 266-74; Kutner & Carl, supra note 53, at
544-49; Kutner, supra note 57, app. at 332. Kutner states that he presented the draft treaty-
statute at a meeting in 1959 in Maimi Beach. See KUTNER, supra note 13, app. XIII at 266.
98 See, e.g., KUTNER, supra note 13, at 85-92; KUTNER, supra note 23, at 5; Kutner, supra
note 14, at 430-31; Luis Kutner, World Habeas Corpus for International Man: A Credo for Inter-
national Due Process of Law, 36 U. DET. L.J. 235, 235 (1959).
99 Kutner & Carl, supra note 53, at 544.
100 Id.
101 Kutner, supra note 57, at 319. For the version of Kutner's proposed Treaty-Statute
of the International Court of Habeas Corpus that he said he presented at the ABA Section
meeting in Miami, Florida on August 25, 1959, see id. app. 331-41. In this proposal, the
International Court of Habeas Corpus would consist of two judges from each signatory
state, some of whom would serve on regional circuit courts. Id.
102 See Kutner & Carl, supra note 53, at 548; see also id. at 550 (requiring exhaustion of
local remedies). Kutner specifically detailed which countries would comprise each circuit,
based on his analyses of "major cultural legal units in the contemporary world." See id. at
544-48, 546 n.398. Although he originally proposed seven circuit courts, see Kutner, supra
note 57, app. at 332 (reprinting 1959 proposal), in later work Kutner refined the bounda-
ries and increased the number of proposed regional courts. See, e.g., Luis Kutner, World
Habeas Corpus: The Legal Ultimate for the Unity of Man, 40 NOTRE DAME LAw. 570, 584-85
(1965) (proposing nine circuit courts of habeas corpus based on principles of "regional
contiguity"); Kutner & Carl, supra note 53, at 544.
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International Court of Habeas Corpus of nine justices;' 3 the regional
courts would decide cases by a majority vote, but the International
Court would require a vote of at least six justices to overturn a na-
tional law. 10 4 This procedure, like others, would "weight the decision-
making process in favor of the particular system of public order under
which the petitioner is detained." 10 5 The diversity of world public or-
ders argued against a single definition of arbitrary or illegal detention;
rather, Kutner thought the circuit courts should determine whether
under all the circumstances the detention was "reasonable,"'0 6 using a
balancing analysis designed to take into account the particularities of
the legal system in question. 10 7
For enforcement, Kutner argued, resort should first be "to the
appropriate regional organization," if one had been established. 108 If
that did not work, Kutner reiterated arguments made in his Oatis peti-
tion as to the range and source of sanctions.'0 9 Kutner's proposal,
then, was comprehensive and detailed, even if it sought to ignore or
minimize aspects of the U.N. Charter (including the domestic jurisdic-
tion clause) arguably designed to limit the effective international en-
forcement of the individual human rights Kutner sought to achieve. 1 0
Just as it had concluded that Kutner's petition for a U.N. writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of William Oatis was inconsistent with legal
limitations on the General Assembly's power,"' so the U.S. State De-
103 Kutner & Carl, supra note 53, at 549.
104 Id. at 550-51.
105 Id. at 551.
106 See id. at 551-52.
107 See id. at 553-54. Kutner envisioned that under this approach, free speech in the
Soviet Union could not at that time be protected but that procedural rights nominally
secured by Soviet law could be, whereas a higher level of protection could be secured in
Latin America, where the constitutions of most countries secured individual rights. See id.;
Kutner, supra note 102, at 589-90 (emphasizing that the standard for determining whether
detentions were unlawful should be situated in the jurisprudence of the area: "In the
U.S.S.R.-Eastern Europe arena, the decision-makers should aim toward greater realization
of human dignity within the framework of the Marxian conception of an ideal society,
whereas the judges in the Arabic region should strive toward the ideal within the structure
of the Islamic religious conceptions, and the judges in the North American arena should
attempt to perfect the Anglo-American conceptions of 'equality under law,' democratic
constitutionalism, etc.").
108 Kutner & Carl, supra note 53, at 556.
109 For example, Kutner argued that the Security Council could be asked to impose
economic or military sanctions, and if it did not act, the General Assembly could do so. See
id. at 557; KUTNER, supra note 23, app. V at 75. Kutner also contemplated that sanctions
could include diplomatic or ideological measures, such as censure. See Kutner & Carl,
supra note 53, at 557-58.
110 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 48-50 (discussing reasons for domestic juris-
diction clause).
1II The State Department's opposition to the 1952 petition was hardly surprising in
light of representations that the United States had made both to other nations and to the
U.S. Senate concerning the effect of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the U.N. Charter.
See id. at 48-50.
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partment disagreed later in the 1950s with Kutner's proposal for a
treaty-statute to establish an international court of habeas corpus.
The State Department objected that it would be impossible to enforce
such a writ even if it were issued.' 12 Moreover, the State Department
argued, the proposed international court would require the develop-
ment of a "code of the substantive international law" because interna-
tional due process lacked "specific canons... relating to the wrongful
detention of persons."113 Kutner responded to the first objection by
arguing at length that most nations comply with international law and
judgments most of the time without coercive sanctions, and thus, that
law in the form of a writ did not ultimately require coercion to be
effective.114 He disputed the need for a code, urging that the pro-
posed court could draw on international custom and general princi-
ples, human rights provisions in national constitutions, the
jurisprudence of arbitral boards relating to aliens' rights, and the de-
velopment of U.N. Charter-based human rights, just as the U.S. Su-
preme Court developed case law from simple constitutional
statements of due process.11 5
Kutner dealt with two other State Department objections more
briefly. The State Department argued that the world had too many
ideological differences to make it practical to seek agreement and that
it was the Administration's policy to "favor methods other than trea-
ties to encourage the international promotion of human rights."' 16
Although Kutner agreed that the world had deep ideological differ-
ences, he asserted that if the United States took a leadership role in
efforts to establish effective enforcement of human rights, many addi-
112 See Luis Kutner, The Case for an International Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Reply, 37 U.
DET. L.J. 605, 606 (1960) [hereinafter Kutner, A Reply] (summarizing State Department
objections); Letter from John M. Raymond, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Luis Kutner 1-2 (Sept. 4, 1958) [hereinafter Letter from John M. Raymond, Sept. 4, 1958]
(on file in the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) (describ-
ing at length the State Department's objections to proposals to establish an International
Court of Habeas Corpus, arguing that it would be an impractical solution to human rights
violations because the United Nations does not have the authority to enforce writs of
habeas corpus); see also Letter from John M. Raymond, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of
State, to Luis Kutner (Oct. 6, 1958) (on file in the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institu-
tion at Stanford University) (regretting that his earlier letter to Kutner was "so unpersua-
sive" and reiterating that "whatever may be said for the concept of 'World Habeas Corpus'
as a theoretical proposition, the concept is not one which can be usefully pursued as a
measure for the international promotion of human rights in today's world"). For a some-
what more positive letter from the State Department in the 1960s, see Letter from Carl F.
Salans, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to Luis Kutner (May 9, 1967) (on file in
the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University), discussed infra note
211.
113 See Kutner, A Reply, supra note 112, at 606 (summarizing State Department
objections).
114 See id. at 606-07; see also Kutner, supra note 102, at 591-94.
1 15 See Kutner, A Reply, supra note 112, at 609-11.
116 Id. at 606 (summarizing State Department objections).
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tional countries would support those efforts.117 Kutner tried to turn
the U.S. argument on itself, suggesting that what distinguished Com-
munist regimes from governance in the free world was the enforcea-
ble rule of law for the benefit of all the people."
C. Domestic and International Supporters of World Habeas
Corpus
Although the U.S. State Department decisively disagreed both
with Kutner's legal analysis of the existing authority of the United Na-
tions and with the practicality of his vision in the foreseeable future,' 1 9
the range and stature of those who supported Kutner's idea is note-
worthy. Roscoe Pound, former Dean of Harvard Law School, wrote
Kutner in 1957, saying that he had just read Kutner's "brochure" on
world habeas corpus and that, as Kutner suggested, "world law" might
develop "exactly as the law of the common-law world has developed
without any super-government."' 20 Commending Kutner's "general
proposition that the concept of the international personality of man is
growing in acceptance," Pound concluded: "[Y] ou seem to me there-
fore to be moving in the right path in insisting upon a general princi-
ple of law rather than a sovereign political authority as the basis of a
world legal order. Certainly not the least feature of the world legal
117 See id. at 611. Kutner noted that in one year the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights reported 2,118 complaints of human rights abuses, but complainants were told the
Commission had no power to take action. Id. at 612. The United Nations' prestige and
principles, Kutner argued, did not gain by "the frustration of victims of oppression." Id.
Kutner noted that other nations have supported plans more comprehensive than Kutner's
proposal for world habeas corpus, and that the United States could be successful in advo-
cating for an international habeas corpus writ if it collaborated with other nations. Id.
And, Kutner rhetorically questioned, "Logically, why would any nation-state which already
provides safeguards against arbitrary arrest oppose an international guarantee?" .Id. at 613.
In response to the fear that false charges would be brought for political purposes, Kutner
asserted that a well-regulated forum for international habeas corpus writs could "weed out
claims without basis in fact." See id.
118 See id. at 614; cf Kutner & Carl, supra note 53, at 541 (arguing that the United
States should frame the battle as "freedom v. non-freedom" rather than "Communism v.
Capitalism," and that a "plea for human liberty would have more appeal to a nation experi-
menting with some type of socialized economy than the glorification of our own brand of
capitalism'").
119 See Kutner, A Reply, supra note 112, at 606; supra notes 31, 54, 55, 112-18 and ac-
companying text.
120 Letter from Roscoe Pound, Harvard Law Sch., to Luis Kutner (Dec. 10, 1957) (on
file in the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University). The letter is
also reproduced in Kutner's 1957 book. See KUTNER, supra note 23 (attached inside front
cover). For a discussion of Pound's intellectual journey from "sociological prophet of a
rising state to bitter critic of the New Deal and its associated institutions," and his some-
what unlikely alliance in the 1950s with trial lawyer Melvin Belli to protect "a distinctly
Anglo-American tradition of individualistic liberty under law" by preserving jury trials and
resisting administrative resolution of common law torts, see John Witt, The King and the
Dean: Melvin Belli, Roscoe Pound, and the Common Law Nation 4, 35-45 (Sept. 15, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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order should be the securing of individual personality."' 21 Pound
continued to express support for Kutner's work for several years. 122
In 1967, another Harvard Law School Dean, Erwin Griswold,
wrote Kutner commending him on his work and urging him to stick
with it. 123 Other American legal academics expressed support of the
idea of world habeas corpus in various writings as well. In 1962, Kut-
ner had published an expanded book version of his 1957 brochure
(also called World Habeas Corpus),' 24 which included a foreword by
Roscoe Pound, 125 and an introduction by Quincy Wright, former head
of the American Society for International Law. 126 And Kutner's ed-
ited collection published in 1970 included separate essays by Yale
professors Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal.' 27
Some members of Congress were also supportive, including (in
the 1950s) Republican Representatives Edith Nourse Rogers, of Mas-
121 Letter from Roscoe Pound to Luis Kutner, supra note 120.
122 See Roscoe Pound, Foreword to KUTNER, supra note 13, at v [hereinafter Pound, Fore-
word]; see also Letter from Roscoe Pound, Harvard Law Sch., to Luis Kutner (Sept. 15,
1961) (on file in the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University);
Letter from Roscoe Pound, Harvard Law Sch., to Luis Kutner (Feb. 16, 1961) (on file in
the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University); Letter from Roscoe
Pound, Harvard Law Sch., to Luis Kutner (May 26, 1959) (on file in the Kutner Archives at
the Hoover Institution at Stanford University). Kutner may have reused Pound's introduc-
tion to the 1962 book and parts of his 1957 letter in what is identified as Roscoe Pound,
Introduction to THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 11 (Luis Kutner ed., 1970), a
book not published until 1970, several years after Pound's death.
123 See Letter from Erwin N. Griswold, Dean, Harvard Law Sch., to Luis Kutner (Oct.
16, 1967) (on file in the Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University)
("You have done great work for World Habeas Corpus. I hope that you can keep nursing
this idea along.").
124 KUTNER, supra note 13. Kutner's 1957 book was published by World Freedom
Press; the 1962 book was published by Oceana Publications, Inc.
125 See Pound, Foreword, supra note 122, at v.
126 Quincy Wright, Introduction to KUTNER, supra note 13, at i. Wright was also "Profes-
sor of the University of Chicago, . . President of the American Association of University
Professors, 1944-46, of the American Political Science Association, 1949-50; [and] of the
International Political Science Association, 1950-51. . . " Letter from Karl W. Deutsch,
President, Am. Political Sci. Ass'n, to Dr. August Schou, Gen. Sec'y, Nobel Peace Prize
Comm., Norwegian Nobel Inst. (undated), excerpted in Allen S. Whiting, In Memoriam:
Quincy Wright, 1890-1970-A Symposium, 14J. CONFLiCr RESOL. 443, 445-46 (1970). Pro-
fessor Wright had taken note of Kutner's proposal well before the 1962 book. See Quincy
Wright, Human Rights and Charter Revision, 296 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc,. 46, 52
n.22 (1954).
127 See Myres S. McDougal, A Practicable Measure for Human Rights, in THE HUMAN RIGHT
TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, supra note 122, at 90; Harold D. Lasswell, The Bond between Prescrip-
tive Content and Procedure, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, supra note 122, at
94. Six years earlier Professor McDougal had praised Kutner's proposal as possibly "pro-
phetic of rational future development." Myres S. McDougal & Gerhard Bebr, Human
Rights in the United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 641 n.177 (1964).
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sachusetts, 128 and John Beamer, of Indiana. 129 In January 1958, Rep-
resentative Beamer inserted in the Congressional Record a long letter he
wrote to the New York Times, commending Kutner's idea of world
habeas corpus.1 30 And as noted earlier, Beamer also introduced a
proposed concurrent resolution, 13 1 for the "United States Govern-
ment [to] assume the leadership in establishing an International
Court of Habeas Corpus to extend legal protection under due process
of law to the life and liberty of individual persons everywhere."1 32
Representative Beamer explained that the resolution "proposes that
our Government cooperate in the work of the Commission on Inter-
national Habeas Corpus, a not-for-profit organization established
under Illinois law by the Honorable Luis Kutner, author of the con-
cept of world habeas corpus and who is a practicing attorney in Chi-
cago." 13 3 Representative Beamer also credited Kutner's petition for a
U.N. writ of habeas corpus as being "greatly instrumental in assisting
me in speeding Oatis' release."'134 In the 1960s, Senators Estes
Kefauver and Strom Thurmond also expressed support, as described
below.
128 See supra note 25. In her remarks in the House of Representatives, Rogers echoed
Kutner's arguments in the petition, asserting that the United Nations has jurisdiction by
virtue of the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter and the UDHR, that Czechoslo-
vakia as a signatory had assumed good faith obligations to enforce human rights, and that
Oatis as a human being and a citizen of the United States was entitled to collective action
from the United Nations to protect his human rights. See 98 CONG. REc. 4,957 (1952).
Under the petition, Rogers argued, the United Nations could order the immediate release
of Oatis into its custody, pending final determination by the ICJ. Id. Describing the peti-
tion as "set[ting] a precedent in international judicial procedure," that, if successful, would
establish "a magna carta for the world," Rogers inserted the actual petition into the Congres-
sional Record. See id. at 4,957-62.
129 Beamer served in the House from 1951 to 1959, and was defeated for reelection in
1958. See Beamer, John Valentine (1896-1964), Biographical Directory of the United
States Congress, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000276 (last
visited Oct. 14, 2005).
130 See 104 CONG. REc. 1,236 (1958).
131 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Beamer's proposed concurrent resolu-
tion was opposed by the State Department. See, e.g., Letter from John M. Raymond, Sept. 4,
1958, supra note 112. For the State Department's objections to Kutner's proposed interna-
tional court of habeas corpus and Kutner's response to those objections, see supra notes
112-18 and accompanying text.
132 104 CONG. REc. 7,130 (1958) (statement of Rep. Beamer). The Concurrent Reso-
lution would have provided financial support for the drafting of "a proposed world treaty-
statute which should provide for establishment of an International Court of Habeas
Corpus competent to issue an international or a United Nations writ of habeas corpus to
any government which is sufficiently charged to be wrongfully detaining a person .. .in
violation of the specific canons of international due process of law." H.R. Res. 318, 85th
Cong. § 7 (1958).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 7,131. But see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (discussing the uncer-
tainty about whether the petition had any effect on Oatis's release).
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In 1962, Justice William Brennan gave an address to the Law and
Laymen Conference of the American Bar Association, later published
as an article in the University of Virginia Law Review, 135 arguing for
treaty protection of criminal trial rights and habeas corpus. Justice
Brennan praised Kutner and his work,' 3 6 describing his idea of imple-
menting an international writ of habeas corpus through a treaty-stat-
ute as a "concrete program whereby the now only morally binding
Universal Declaration of Human Rights would be made, by the volun-
tary consent of the nations of the world, a legally binding commit-
ment enforceable in an International Court of Habeas Corpus which
would function through appropriately accessible regional courts.' 3 7
Acknowledging that Kutner's plan might not be "the only or the best
plan," Justice Brennan argued that it showed the "obvious utility of
world habeas corpus as a tool for the avoidance of the dangers of the
police state, and its great promise as a contribution toward preserving
and furthering world peace by repudiating, through an enforceable
international rule of law, systematic and deliberate denial of human
rights."138
Justice Brennan's speech generated additional support, including
from Senator Estes Kefauver, who praised the idea of an international
writ of habeas corpus, as Justice Brennan described it, and had Justice
Brennan's remarks reprinted in the Congressional Record.139 The New
York Times also endorsed the idea of an international court of habeas
135 William J. Brennan, Jr., International Due Process and the Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1258
(1962).
136 See id. at 1260 ("Why should we not internationalize the writ of habeas corpus along
these lines to enforce the guarantees of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? The
research of Professor Luis Kutner and others has demonstrated that it can be done. Pro-
fessor Kutner has performed an invaluable service for the world in blueprinting a plan for
world habeas corpus including a judicial structure and a procedure.").
137 Id. at 1260-61.
138 Id. at 1261. Justice Arthur Goldberg also expressed support for Kutner's idea. See
Arthur J. Goldberg, An Introduction to World Habeas Corpus, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1967),
reprinted as Foreword to THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDuAL FREEDOM, supra note 122, at 7-8.
The 1970 book also includes chapters reprinting earlier works by Justices Brennan and
Douglas. William J. Brennan, Jr., International Due Process and the Law, reprinted in THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, sup-a note 122, at 85; William 0. Douglas, The Rule
of Law in World Affairs, reprinted in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, supra note
122, at 59.
139 See 108 CONG. REC. app. A6774-75 (1962) (statement of Sen. Estes Kefauver) (ex-
tension of remarks). Later in the 1960s and early 1970s, Senator Alan Cranston, in corre-
spondence to Kutner, expressed his agreement "with most of the objectives and principles
of WORLD HABEAS CORPUS" on the issue of the release of two Israeli detainees. Letter
from Sen. Alan Cranston to Luis Kutner (Dec. 12, 1969) (on file in the Kutner Archives at
the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) (capitalization in original); see also Letter
from Sen. Alan Cranston to Luis Kutner (Oct. 11, 1971) (offering "to bring World Habeas
Corpus to the attention of Members of Congress for Peace through Law") (on file in the
Kutner Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University).
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corpus in an editorial of August 9, 1962.140 The Times editorial dis-
cussed the history of habeas corpus and noted its unavailability in
Communist countries and in some "so-called democracies." The edi-
torial continued, "Even the best-intentioned government may some-
times find the practice of preventive detention convenient, so that a
man is punished for the crimes he might commit if he were at lib-
erty." 141 For this reason, the Times agreed with Justice Brennan that
the proposal would not "secure immediate and universal accept-
ance."1 42 Nonetheless, the Times editorialized,
Something could be done ... by setting up a new court through
treaties among the nations. Such a tribunal, once established,
might give the individual citizen in any member country a new ap-
peal to mankind's sense ofjustice. If the system worked even with a
limited number of nations, it might influence countries where indi-
vidual rights are not now respected.
This task will some day have to be attempted. Why not now
under the auspices of the United States?1 43
In 1967, support for the idea of world habeas corpus came from
two public officials holding quite different political perspectives. Ar-
thur J. Goldberg, former Supreme Court Justice and
then-Ambassador to the United Nations, lauded " [t] he idea of world-
wide habeas corpus, internationally recognized and enforceable in an
appropriate international court" as advancing the rule of law and "last-
ing peace."1 44 While he cautioned against "utopian dreams" because
"there is not yet universal agreement on the content and extent of
international rights, much less on the form of the necessary guaran-
tees," Goldberg also said that "a beginning is being made, in the ef-
forts of international organizations to define and categorize human
rights, and in the work of private bodies such as the Commission for
International Due Process of Law, ' '145 a body founded by Kutner.1 46
That same year, Senator Strom Thurmond argued that world habeas
corpus was an appropriate response to Algeria's detention of Moise
Tshombe, former secessionist and political leader in the Congo. 14 7




144 Goldberg, supra note 138, at 1-2 (reprinting Goldberg's speech).
145 Id. at 2.
146 See Katin, supra note 22, at 400-01.
147 See 113 CONG. REc. 24,426 (1967) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). Tshombe had
been the political leader and President of Katanga, a secessionist province of the Congo,
who also served briefly as Premier of the Congo after the Congo reacquired control of
Katanga. See Katin, supra note 22, at 414; Tshombe Is Dead, Algeria Reports, N.Y. TiMEs, June
30, 1969, at 1. Involved in what the news story called a "power struggle" with President
Kasavuba, Tshombe fled into exile (for a second time) and received asylum in Spain. See
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Tshombe's wife had retained Kutner to prepare a petition for world
habeas corpus to secure the release of her husband;1 48 the petition,
which Kutner reportedly sent to the United Nations and to the gov-
ernments of Algeria, Spain, the Congo, and the United Kingdom, was
not successful.1 49
Kutner also garnered support from abroad for his ideas, which he
on occasion presented in international legal gatherings. 150 The for-
mer ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court ofJapan and a member of the
International Court of Justice, Kotara Tanaka, reportedly endorsed
Kutner's proposal. 151 The idea was also discussed at international
meetings in Mexico City in 1961 and in Edinburgh in 1962, according
to Kutner.152 A 1970 collection edited by Kutner included essays con-
tributed by authors from around the world, including Gebhard
Mfiller, who served as chief justice of the well-respected German Con-
stitutional Court, and jurists from Italy, Uganda, Cambodia, Taiwan,
Colombia, Tunis, and Ecuador.153
Although I have found fewer references to the idea of world
habeas corpus by others after 1970, Kutner's own writing on the idea
extends into the early 1990s and addresses the plight of Soviet Jewry
Tshombe Is Dead, supra. The Congo tried and convicted Tshombe in absentia for murder
and treason and sentenced him to death. See Tshombe, Moise Kapenda, in The Columbia
Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, (2001-05) available at http://www.bartleby.com/65/ts/
Tshombe.html (visited Oct 31, 2005); Katin, supra note 22, at 414. In 1967, while on a
flight from Spain to the United Kingdom, Tshombe's plane was hijacked and taken to
Algeria, where Tshombe was detained; Tshombe died two years later, still in Algerian cus-
tody. See Tshombe Is Buried in Brussels; Sons Weep at His Grave, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1969, at 6;
Tshombe is Dead, supra.
148 See Letter from Ruth Tshombe to Luis Kutner (July 12, 1967) (on file in the Kutner
Archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University); Kutner, Ombudsman, supra note
22, at 354; U.N. to Get Petition for Tshombe Today, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1967, at 6.
149 See Kutner, Ombudsman, supra note 22, at 354 (describing Tshombe's death after
petition for world habeas corpus was filed). The petition referred to both the General
Assembly's jurisdiction and that of the ICJ, as had the Oatis petition, and asked the Human
Rights Commission to create an ad hoc tribunal to deal with the question. See Katin, supra
note 22, at 415-16. Kutner questioned Algeria's report that Tshombe had died of natural
causes. Kutner, Ombudsman, supra note 22, at 354.
150 See, e.g., Paul P. Kennedy, Lawyers Abroad Seek Safeguards, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1964, at
20 (reporting on Kutner's call for study of the possibility of international habeas corpus
during the Tenth Conference of the International Bar Association in Mexico City).
151 See Kutner, supra note 57, at 279 (quoting Letter from Kotara Tanaka, Justice, Int'l
Court of Justice, to Luis Kutner (July 9, 1960)).
152 See id. at 279, 281.
153 See THE HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, supra note 122. Foreign contribu-
tors apart from Mfiller included Silvio Tavolaro, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation,
Italy, id. at 31; Udo Udoma, described as Chief Justice of Ugandi, id. at 35; Norodom
Sihanouk, described as Head of State of Cambodia, id. at 47; Ku Cheng-Kang, President of
the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League of the Republic of China (Taiwan), id. at 49;
Samuel Barrientes Restrepo, a Colombian judge (described by the title "Magistrado de la
Sala de Casaci6n Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia"), id. at 51; Raoul Benattar, of the
law faculty of Tunis, id. at 55; and Gustavo Salgado, of the law faculty of the Central Univer-
sity in Quito, Ecuador, id. at 189.
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and of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. 154 His work included an additional
effort to deploy an international writ of habeas corpus before the
United Nations to secure the release of American hostages in 1989.155
D. Countercurrents: Anti-Habeas and Anti-Human Rights
Movements in the United States
Kutner's proposal for a world habeas corpus writ took seriously
the idea of international human rights as a form ofjudicially enforcea-
ble law, an idea that, in the 1950s, was being aggressively resisted by
the American Bar Association, Southern Congressmen, and potent
political forces.15 6 And Kutner's views of the legal force of the U.N.
Charter went well beyond those of the State Department, as discussed
above, or the U.S. courts. Indeed, U.S. courts were at best hesitant to
embrace arguments based on the U.N. Charter. Although a lower
court in California relied on the U.N. Charter (and referred to the
154 See, e.g., Luis Kutner, Soviet Jewny and World Habeas Corpus, 37 OKLA. L. REv. 495
(1984) [hereinafter Kutner, Soviet Jewy]; Luis Kumer & Ved P. Nanda, Document, Petition
of the Tamils of Sri Lanka Deprived of Their Internationally Protected Human Rights for a Grant of
United Nations Effective Remedy and Declaratory Relief United Nations ex rel. Global Org. of People
of Indian Origin v. Sri Lanka, reprinted in 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 185, 208 (1992) (end-
ing petition with a plea "that the U.N. establish an ad hoc tribunal for Writ of World
Habeas Corpus to ventilate and adjudicate all cases of deprivation of human liberty").
I should note that Kutner made stronger claims about himself in his later writings
than he did in his earlier works. Compare Kutner, Soviet Jewry, supra, at 495 n.* (describing
himself, in 1984, as having been a "Professor of Law, Yale Law School"), with Kutner,
Ombudsman, supra note 22, at 352 n.* (describing himself, in 1969, as a "former visiting
Associate Professor, Yale Law School"). See also E-mail from Judith Miller to author, supra
note 22 (noting that Yale Law School "found only one mention of [Kutner]: he co-taught
Criminal Law and Administration in the fall of 1948 with Professor George Dession" but
also noting that seminars were not listed in the bulletin at that time). For another possible
example, compare Kutner, supra note 102, at 571-72 (asserting, in 1965, that he first pro-
posed the idea of world habeas corpus in response to Hitler's Mein Kampf in 1931), with
Kutner, supra note 14, at 418 n.6 (stating, in 1954, that it was at the time of Cardinal
Mindzsenty's arrest in 1949 "that the idea for the United Nations Writ of habeas corpus was
conceived"). Particular caution may be needed in evaluating factual claims on other topics
that Kutner made in later writings. For example, a 1967 New York Times story quoted Kut-
ner as saying, "'For the last 15 years, . . . it has been the unanimous consensus of civilized
nations that the General Assembly ... has the inherent power to set up ad hoc tribunals to
process writs of world habeas corpus in cases in which individuals have been denied due
process of law."' UN. to Get Petition for Tshombe Today, supra note 148. But, as the story
went on to note, "[n]ot all the experts agree," id. and the U.S. State Department had quite
plainly and vehemently disagreed with Kutner. See supra notes 31, 54, and 112-18 and
accompanying text.
155 Sen. Moynihan inserted a press release into the Congressional Record that described a
petition for a writ of world habeas corpus that Kutner (then over eighty years old) pre-
pared on behalf of Terry Anderson and other hostages held in Lebanon and submitted to
the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights. See 135 CONG. REc. S15,225
(daily ed. Nov. 8, 1989) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
156 See ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 213-35; TANANBA.UM, supra note 15, at 1-31.
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UDHR) in striking down a racially discriminatory state law, 157 it was
overruled on this point by the California Supreme Court in Sei Fujii v.
State,158 holding that the U.N. Charter was not a self-executing
treaty.159 In the U.S. Supreme Court, while individual Justices referred
to the U.N. Charter as authority in Oyama v. California,160 the Court
itself remained relatively silent on the relationship between the
United States' international commitments and the protection of indi-
vidual rights in the United States. This was not from want of briefing:
From the late 1940s through the mid-1950s, lawyers urged arguments
on the Supreme Court based on the U.N. Charter in support of civil
rights claims. 161 While this briefing did not provoke much in the way
of overt references, the "silent dialogue" with the transnational, de-
scribed by Professor Judith Resnik, suggests that developing human
rights standards, against the spectre of totalitarian abuses in World
War II, may have left some imprint on the cases. 162 The Court's hesi-
157 See Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 485-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950), vacated, 242 P.2d
617 (Cal. 1952); cf Re Drummond Wren, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 674, 677-78 (High Ct. Ont.)
(invalidating a restrictive covenant discriminating against Jews as against public policy,
based, in part, on Canada's commitment to Articles 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter).
158 242 P. 2d at 620-22.
159 See id. (concluding that U.N. Charter Articles 55 and 56, concerning human rights
and equality, were "promise[s] of future action" rather than justiciable rights). While con-
cluding that the U.N. Charter did not of its own force invalidate the alien land law at issue,
the court found the state law unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
630. And the court appeared to leave open the possibility that the U.N. Charter might
influence interpretation, stating, "The humane and enlightened objectives of the United
Nations Charter are, of course, entitled to respectful consideration by the courts and legis-
latures of every member nation, since that document expresses the universal desire of
thinking men for peace and for equality of rights and opportunities. The charter repre-
sents a moral commitment of foremost importance, and we must not permit the spirit of
our pledge to be compromised or disparaged in either our domestic or foreign affairs." Id.
at 622. One member of the California Supreme Court wrote separately to emphasize the
importance of the U.N. Charter to the issue before the court. See id. at 632 (Carter, J.,
concurring) (noting U.N. Charter as an additional reason to closely scrutinize racial classi-
fications); see also Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948) (Carter, J., concurring)
(referring to the U.N. Charter's guarantees of human rights for all in support of the
court's conclusion that a state law prohibiting interracial marriages was unconstitutional).
160 See 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (Black, J.,joined by Douglas, J., concurring) (not-
ing the U.S. commitment to the U.N. Charter and its purpose of advancing human rights
without regard to distinctions of race as an additional reason to invalidate a state alien land
law that worked in a racially discriminatory manner); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., joined by
Rutledge, J., concurring) (noting alien land law's inconsistency with the Charter as "one
more reason why the statute must be condemned"). For an early citation to the UDHR,
see American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 550 n.5 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
161 See Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights
Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IowA L. REv. 901, 931-48, 950-56 (1984) (identifying at least thir-
teen Supreme Court decisions in addition to Oyama between 1948 and 1955 in which one
or more briefs relied on the U.N. Charter).
162 SeeJudith Resnik, Law's Migration: From Shelley v. Kraemer to CEDAW and Kyoto-
American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE LJ.
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 142-50, on file with author); Lockwood, supra note
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tation to overtly rely on the Charter is perhaps not surprising, given
the explosive political dynamics of Cold War anti-communism, Mc-
Carthyism, and segregationism that, Carol Anderson argues, also led
the NAACP to abandon its efforts to rely on human rights, such as
those expressed in the UDHR, and to emphasize the narrower set of
civil rights expressed in the U.S. Constitution. 163
As Professors Anderson, Resnik, and others suggest, the Court's
hesitation overtly to refer to international human rights commitments
must be understood in the context of political backlash and opposi-
tion. 164 The late 1940s and early 1950s saw the birth of the United
Nations and the adoption of the UDHR, with significant U.S. partici-
pation, but it was in this same period that virulent opposition to the
idea of international human rights emerged. 165 Indeed, almost simul-
taneous with the emergence of the idea of world habeas corpus was
the emergence of an anti-human rights movement in Congress and
the American Bar Association 166 and an anti-federal habeas corpus
movement in the state courts.' 67 In light of these countertrends, the
amount of support Kutner was able to muster is perhaps even more
noteworthy.
1. Bricker and Congress: Resisting International Human Rights of
Racial Equality
Congressional resistance to the application of transnational
human rights norms in the United States was epitomized by the efforts
led by Senator John Bricker to amend the Constitution to limit the
161, at 948-49 (concluding that the U.N. Charter was an important, if silent, influence on
the judiciary during the civil rights movement); see also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS 79-114 (2000) (discussing the influence of Cold War politics on the Supreme
Court's desegregation decisions); RIc-LAD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS
197-213 (1999) (discussing various Supreme Court cases of the post-World War II era that
demonstrate the influence of anti-Nazism and anti-Sovietism on the Court). Traces of the
Court's concern for the U.S. position in the world community may be read into the Court's
reference to the "American ideal of fairness" in explaining why the Fifth Amendment was
now being read to prohibit racial segregation in the District of Columbia schools. See Boll-
ing v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Lockwood, supra note 161, at 943-44 (noting this
passage in Boiling). It is only in the context of a community beyond our shores that refer-
ence to an "American ideal" would have the kind of reverberation that was obviously in-
tended, whether this is understood as a reference to international human rights law or
rather to the more political divisions of the Cold War.
163 See ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 6-7, 273-75.
164 See id. at 254-55; Resnik, supra note 162 (manuscript at 125, 141-44).
165 See ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 6-7; TANANBAuM, supra note 15, at 16-17.
166 See TANANBAUM, supra note 15, at 7-15, 24-31.
167 See Victoria A. Saker, Federalism, the Great Writ, and Extrajudicial Politics: The Confer-




domestic effects of international conventions and agreements. 16  Al-
though a number of arguments in favor of various proposed versions
of the Bricker Amendment were made, many supporters sought to
limit the effect of treaties on U.S. law in order to prevent international
human rights law from interfering with domestic conditions-for ex-
ample, to prevent Congress from enacting anti-lynching legislation to
implement the U.N. Charter, or to avoid courts giving domestic effect
to the international human rights covenants then being drafted within
the United Nations. 169 Fears that the U.N. Charter, to which the
United States was already a signatory, would be treated as domesti-
cally enforceable law were specially palpable in the South where the
Charter's stated commitment to the equality of all persons was cor-
rectly seen as a threat to the system of racial segregation. 170
The premises of this opposition were utterly incompatible with
the premises of Kutner's concept for world habeas corpus. Kutner
argued that Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter should be treated
as a legal basis for his proposed world writ of habeas corpus. 171 Article
55 provides that 'the United Nations shall promote . . . universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion."17 2 It was this provision that was relied on by several Justices
in the Oyama case, 173 which in turn fueled efforts to amend the Con-
stitution. Southern Senators were particularly concerned about inter-
168 There is now an extensive literature on the Bricker Amendment movement. See,
e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 218-56; TANANBAUM, supra note 15; Natalie Hevener Kauf-
man & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The
Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 309 (1988). This political movement was
encouraged by the position of the American Bar Association, which in 1952 recommended
a constitutional amendment to provide that a treaty conflicting "with any provision of this
Constitution shall not be of any force or effect," and that a treaty could "become effective
as internal law ... only through legislation [that Congress] could enact under its dele-
gated powers in the absence of such treaty." TANANBAUM, supra note 15, app. B, at 222.
There were multiple versions of a proposed amendment introduced in the Senate. See id.
apps. A-M at 221-27. The version that came closest to Senate passage, the so-called
George Substitute, would have provided that a treaty provision "which conflicts with this
Constitution shall not be of any force or effect" and that international agreements other
than treaties could become effective as internal law only by an act of Congress. Id. app. I at
225; see id. at 178-81 (describing how this language came within one vote of passage in the
Senate).
169 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 221-23; Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note
168, at 323-24.
170 The NAACP's complaint to the United Nations about racial discrimination within
the United States, see ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 93-112, no doubt fed some of the back-
lash that gave momentum to the Bricker Amendment.
171 See supra note 75.
172 U.N. Charter art. 55.
173 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (Black, J.,joined by Douglas,
J., concurring); see also id. at 673 (Murphy, J., joined by Rutledge, J., concurring). The
lower court decision in Sei Fujii also fueled concern. See TANANBAUM, supra note 15, at 5-6.
2006]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
national treaties' effects on the "'sovereign rights of the States'";1 74
state sovereignty in this period was closely associated with defense of
segregation and resistance to federal anti-lynching laws.17 5
Although the Bricker Amendment failed to receive the requisite
votes in the Senate, "[t]o help defeat the amendment, the Eisenhower
administration promised that the United States would not accede to
international human rights covenants or conventions." 176 That one of
the concerns behind the Bricker Amendment was to prevent use of
the U.N. Charter as a legal basis for outlawing racial segregation
might have been thought to discredit resistance to international
human rights norms. Instead, the controversy surrounding the
Bricker Amendment persisted, contributing to the United States' fail-
ure to agree to major human rights conventions for many years and
then doing so only subject to extensive reservations and
understandings.1 77
2. State Opposition to Federal Habeas Corpus
During the same time period, resistance by state courts and state
prosecutors to the growth of federal constitutional criminal law and
the use of federal habeas corpus as a tool to review state court convic-
tions increased. t 78 The Conference of State Court Chief Justices (the
Chief Justices Conference), formed in 1949, focused considerable at-
174 See TANANBAUM, supra note 15, at 4 (quoting the minority report by Southern Sena-
tors opposing the Fair Employment Practices bill); see also Kaufman & Whiteman, supra
note 168, at 315.
175 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 4 (discussing Eleanor Roosevelt's efforts to
insert a "federal-state" clause in the draft Covenant on Human Rights, to mollify Southern
opposition and fears of federal interference with "the sacred troika of lynching, Southern
Justice, and Jim Crow schools").
176 Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 341, 348-49 (1995); TANANBAUAM, supra note 15, at 199 (describ-
ing Secretary Dulles's representation that the President would not seek Senate ratification
of any U.N. human rights agreements).
177 See Henkin, supra note 176, at 341-47. For example, the United States did not
ratify and implement the Genocide Convention, which opened for signature in 1948, until
1988. See id. at 347; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, opened for signature, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly in 1966, was not ratified by the United States until 1992. See
Henkin, supra note 176, at 348; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinaf-
ter ICCPR].
178 See Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal Justice, 4 WAYNE L. REv.
191, 201 (1958) (noting that state courts' opposition to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
"involve[d] something more than considerations of comity .... The fervor with which the
movement [was] supported reveal[ed] very substantial opposition to and dissatisfaction
with the new role of the Supreme Court as supervisor of state criminal procedure"); see also
Granor v. Gonzalez, 226 F.2d 83, 93 n.7 (9th Cir. 1955) (stating, with respect to federal
habeas review of state court convictions, that "this jurisdiction thus vested in the federal
courts.., has given rise to much agitation on the part of the Conference of Chief Justices,
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tention in its first fifteen years on the existence and scope of federal
habeas corpus review of state court criminal convictions.179 The con-
cerns of the Chief Justices Conference are reflected in a 1952 resolu-
tion opposing review of state courtjudgments by courts other than the
Supreme Court. I' In 1955, the Chief Justices Conference (acting
jointly with a committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference) recom-
mended a statute that would have substantially limited federal habeas
jurisdiction to review state court convictions, a proposal that passed
the House in 1956 but was blocked in the Senate in part by the opposi-
tion of civil rights proponents.""' In 1957, the Chief Justices Confer-
ence issued a long and controversial report on federalism and judicial
decisions that was pointedly critical of the Supreme Court (though
without mentioning Brown v. Board of Education)'82-at a time when
some Southern politicians were calling for "massive resistance" to the
Supreme Court's desegregation decisions. 8 3 The Federalism Re-
port's timing and evident hostility to the Supreme Court provoked
the Association of State Attorneys General and other groups for a revision of Section 2254
of Title 28").
179 See Saker, supra note 167, at 131-33. As Saker reports, the statute governing federal
habeas review of state court convictions, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, was enacted into law in 1948; the
Chief Justices Conference was organized in 1949. See id. Although initially the Chief Jus-
tices Conference was concerned both with judicial efficiency (manifested in efforts to im-
prove state postconviction review) and state sovereignty (manifested in effforts to "reduce
federal district judges' discretion to review state rulings on constitutional claims"), by later
in the 1950s "the states' rights element came to dominate the [Conference] leadership, its
committee on habeas corpus, and its legislative proposals." Id. at 133.
180 See id. at 134. At least one scholar has implied that hostility to any lower federal
court habeas review was reflected in the Chief Justices Conference's refusal in 1953 to
adopt the recommendation of its own committe on habeas corpus-that the lower federal
courts' powers to issue habeas corpus be limited to those cases in which the Supreme
Court, on review of state court proceedings, "expressly reserved to the prisoner the right to
apply for habeas corpus." See Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70
HARv. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1956) (noting that the Chief Justices Conference rejected this
recommendation "and reaffirmed its earlier resolution"); but cf Saker, supra note 167, at
134 (offering another explanation). (The Court's practice of noting the availability of
habeas review was newly developed in the 1950s and, according to one scholar, was viewed
(especially by civil rights lawyers) as a positive signal of the merits of the petitioner's claims.
See RobertJerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 869, 906-08 (1994).
181 See Schaefer, supra note 180, at 19; Saker, supra note 167, at 135-36 (noting objec-
tions by, inter alia, Thurgood Marshall, then special counsel to the NAACP). The ABA
Section on Judicial Administration also lent its support to this proposed legislation. See
Saker, supra note 167, at 135; see also Cranor v. Gonzalez, 226 F.2d at 93 n.7 (noting that a
proposed amendment to the federal habeas statute, having the approval of the various
"objecting groups, was drafted by a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United
States and has been introduced in Congress as House Bill 5649 and Senate Bill 1753").
182 See Saker, supra note 167, at 138-39.
183 For a description of the resistance to the Court's school desegregation decision, see
MICHALJ. KLARMAN, FROMJIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTs 320-24, 334-35 (2004) (noting, inter
alia, the "Southern Manifesto," signed in 1956 by most Southern members of Congress,
condemning Brown as a "'clear abuse ofjudicial power"' and pledging the South to resist
the decision). Saker credits Alex Bickel with pointing out the Federalism Report's "cardi-
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criticism of it "as a surreptitious attack on Brown," costing its organiza-
tional author some credibility, although the Chief Justices Confer-
ence's efforts to procure amendments to the federal habeas corpus
statute persisted well into the 1960s.18 4
In the early 1950s, there was also an effort by a large contingent
of state attorneys general to prevent inferior federal courts from hear-
ing habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners. In United States ex rel.
Elliott v. Hendricks,'8 5 the attorneys general of forty other states signed
on to the brief of the State of Pennsylvania challenging the constitu-
tionality of review of state prisoners' habeas claims by inferior federal
courts.1 8 6 The en banc Court of Appeals decisively and unambigu-
ously rejected the challenge, which seems to have consisted of three
elements: a claim (on which the court spent little time) that the stat-
ute violated the Seventh Amendment by having a federal court reex-
amine state court factfinding; 8 7 an argument that habeas corpus is a
suit against the sovereign and thus barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment;18 8 and finally, an implicit claim that having inferior federal
courts review state court proceedings was unconstitutional.18 9 In re-
sponding to the claim that habeas corpus was barred as a suit against a
state, the Third Circuit discussed the "well-settled line" of federal cases
upholding the availability of habeas corpus relief for state court pris-
oners. 19 0 The court also reasoned,
[T]o argue that the habeas corpus proceeding is a suit against Penn-
sylvania is not an accurate way to describe its nature. From the be-
ginning habeas corpus has been the means by which one who
claims to have been held in illegal custody of another has the right
to have the legality of his custody determined. The writ proceeds
against the custodian. If it is found the custody is illegal, the custo-
dian is directed to discharge the person detained. 9 1
On the last point, the court acknowledged the "not unnatural irrita-
tion that the review of state courts comes at the inferior federal court
nal sin: it lent respectable support to Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus' vow to defy the
Court's decision in Cooper v. Aaron." Saker, supra note 167, at 140.
184 Saker, supra note 167, at 140; see id. at 139-45.
185 213 F.2d 922 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 851 (1954).
186 Id. at 924; see also Schaefer, supra note 180, at 18 (noting the objections of the
National Association of Attorneys General to the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal
courts and specifically noting that "the attorneys general of forty-one states" had joined in
the brief arguing the unconstitutionality of the federal habeas corpus state).
187 Hendricks, 213 F.2d at 925-26.
188 Id. at 926-28; see U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1890).
189 See Hendricks, 213 F.2d at 928.
190 See id. at 926-28.
191 Id. at 926. The court's description of the writ as outside the scope of rules barring
suits against the sovereign is consistent with historic understandings of the writ. See, e.g., Ex
parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 167-68 (1908); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
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level,"' 9 2 but noted that enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended and understood to increase federal power to review state
processes:
The battle against federal interference with some of these state
processes was lost when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
The Amendment, as every high school boy knows, forbids states to
deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. That necessarily confers federal power to prevent states from
doing the forbidden thing. Then the Amendment goes on and by
express terms gives the Congress the power to enforce the provi-
sions by appropriate legislation.1 93
Although the Third Circuit's decision may have discouraged similar
consitutional challenges, resistance to the scope of federal habeas re-
view of state court convictions continued.
The assertion of federal judicial power to entertain petitions for
writs of habeas corpus on behalf of state-sentenced prisoners, then,
coexisted uneasily with a virulent form of state sovereigntism. In the
1950s and 1960s, from Brown v. Allen,19 4 to Fay v. Noia,195 and Henry v.
Mississippi,19 6 the Supreme Court's willingness to reconsider convic-
tions and to ignore procedural failures in state courts in order to pro-
vide relief for perceived violations of the Federal Constitution
remained controversial. 9 7 These extensions of federal habeas corpus
192 Hendricks, 213 F.2d at 928.
193 Id. Does this passage raise the possibility that before the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress lacked power to extend federal habeas review to state court convictions? For a
rejection of such an argument, see Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene,
Breard, and the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doc-
trine, 87 GEO. L.J. 1, 65-66 n.412 (1998). Cf Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension
Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 862, 868 (1994) (arguing that the "Suspension Clause and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment together are best read to mandate federal habeas review of the convictions of state
prisoners"). It is true that the Court has distinguished Congress' powers to abrogate state
immunity from suit under the Fourteenth Amendment and under the constitutional provi-
sions that predate passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59
(1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). But note that Congress in 1833
provided a jurisdictional basis for federal officials held in state custody to seek federal
court habeas relief, see Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634-35, and in 1842
authorized federal judges to issue habeas corpus writs to state prisoners who are citizens or
subjects of foreign states, see Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539, 539-40, discussed in
RICHARD H. FALLON,JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1340-41 (4th ed. 1996). Analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this
Article.
194 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
195 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88
(1977), and by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 744-51 (1991).
196 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
197 For a well-known article objecting to the use of habeas corpus for open-ended relit-
igation of criminal convictions, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
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received considerable support as well as opposition, in part because of
the relationship of the movement for racial equality to the issues or
facts in several key cases,' 98 and in part because of the perceived gulf
between the federal and state courts in the quality ofjustice and inde-
pendence of judging. 199
E. World Habeas Corpus: Only for Others?
As we have seen, there was support from some leading public
figures for the idea of world habeas corpus in the 1950s and 1960s.
According to some scholars, this support might reflect an understand-
ing that world habeas corpus would have an effect only on persons
held by other countries, not by the United States.200 Justice Brennan's
argument in the University of Virginia Law Review drew an analogy be-
tween what the United States already had in the way of federal habeas
corpus for state court prisoners and world habeas corpus; the implica-
tion plainly was that the world should develop a remedy like that
which exists in the United States to prevent and redress unlawful de-
tentions.20 This implication is also reflected in Representative Rog-
ers's comments in 1952 in support of a world habeas corpus petition:
"I feel the petition points the way to the extension on a world scale of
our Anglo-Saxon and democratic forms of justice which guarantee a
fair and impartial trial to all people."20 2 There does appear to be a
belief underlying the support of some American proponents of Kut-
ner's ideas that international law and international habeas corpus
would primarily constrain other countries-not because they would
not apply to the United States in principle, but because of a self-con-
ception of the United States as a leader in human rights and the de-
velopment of international law. Arthur Goldberg, for example, wrote,
"It is peculiarly fitting that we in the United States should heartily sup-
port the movement for international habeas corpus," because we
"have had long domestic experience with the 'great writ,' and experi-
ence in which we take a good deal of pride."20 3 It is no doubt easier to
198 See generally Glennon, supra note 180, at 905-18 (discussing the role expanded fed-
eral habeas jurisdiction played in the civil rights movement).
199 See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (argu-
ing that institutional differences between federal and state trial courts make federal courts
a preferable forum for litigating constitutional claims like those raised by prisoners and
criminal defendants).
200 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1971, 1988-89 (2004) (suggesting that given existing U.S. constitutional protec-
tions, American supporters of international human rights protections after World War II
assumed that it "was more for the rest of the world than it was for us . . . . Americans
imagined international law applying to the world, but not applying-or not applying in
exactly the same way-to America").
201 See Brennan, supra note 135, at 1260.
202 98 CONG. REc. 4,957 (1952).
203 Goldberg, supra note 138, at 1.
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advance a particular commitment to law when we believe we already
embody it,204 and it is possible that some of the political support for
world habeas corpus reflected a Cold War ideology that far more read-
ily envisioned its use for those held in Communist-bloc countries than
for those held in the United States.
Yet in the end it is too facile to say that the proponents of human
rights-or this particular idea of an international writ of habeas
corpus-did not intend or foresee their possible application in the
United States. 20 5 Controversy over the development of human rights
covenants and the application of the U.N. Charter as domestic law
had been fueled in part by concerns of some to avoid, and the efforts
by others to generate, a U.N. investigation of racial segregation and
racial injustice in the United States. 20 6 And from his earliest writings
Kutner noted that the United States, and other countries that gener-
ally protected individual rights, had at times departed from interna-
tional human rights standards, 20 7  plainly implying that an
international remedy might be helpful, and applicable, in those situa-
tions. Indeed, he devoted several pages in his 1962 book to explain-
ing why U.S. participation in an international habeas corpus court
204 Cf Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1821, 1856 (2003)
(suggesting that a nation's likelihood ofjoining a human rights treaty is based on the cost
of commitment and that countries may consider how much change would be needed from
existing practices to ratify a treaty, and predicting that when less change is required ratifi-
cation would be more likely).
205 Cf., e.g., Editorial, supra note 140 (suggesting that even the "best-intentioned gov-
ernment" might resort to "preventive detention," plainly implying that an international
writ of habeas corpus might be an appropriate remedy in such a case). Although the
antecedent for the New York Times's reference to the acts of a well-intentioned government
is unclear, it should be noted that the United States had employed a form of preventive
detention against Japanese-American citizens in World War II. See, e.g., Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
206 See ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 74-96, 101-12 (discussing State Department efforts
to prevent U.N. investigation of racial issues in the United States, the petition of the Na-
tional Negro Congress to the United Nations in 1946 for U.N. intervention on behalf of
oppressed African Americans, and the NAACP's 1947 petition, An Appeal to the World).
207 See, e.g., KUTNER, supra note 23, at 15 (stating in 1957 that "even the United States,
Britain and France were not above violating the human rights provisions of the Charter
after World War II had come to an end," and specifically noting U.S. transfers of German
prisoners of war to France for forced labor in apparent violation of the Charter and the
Geneva Convention); Kutner, supra note 57, at 313-14 (making the same observation in
1962); Luis Kutner, World Habeas Corpus and International Extradition, 41 U. DET. L.J. 525,
533 (1964) (noting with apparent concern that the United States has no procedures for a
person subject to extradition to have recourse to a supranational judicial body to test the
validity of extradition, detention, or arrest); see also Kutner, supra note 14, at 421 & n.22
(stating that, in light of the critical reception of claims for the self-executing character of
the Charter (including in Sei Fuji), " [h] ope for effective national implementation of inter-
national commitments within the immediate future seems now too optimistic . .. [and]
contemporary counter-reactions and traditional judicial cautiousness require that the pro-
ponents of effective human rights now look elsewhere for their realization").
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would not be inconsistent with U.S. sovereignty. 20 8 Comments like
those of Justices Brennan and Goldberg may mirror the considera-
tions that led the Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona,20 9 to discuss
foreign countries' approaches to custodial interrogation and to con-
clude that the United States should "give at least as much protection
to... rights grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth Amend-
ment" as otherjurisdictions gave based on principles ofjustice "not so
specifically defined."210 The U.S. Constitution, these comments re-
flect, should be in the vanguard of protecting individual rights relat-
ing to liberty.2 11 Thus, one could say, an optimistic faith that the
United States was in the vanguard of individual rights protection was
coupled, at least on occasion, with a determination that it should re-
main there when judged by international comparative standards.
II
WHERE IS "WORLD HABEAs CoRPus" TODAY?
Kutner's vision of a United Nations Writ of Habeas Corpus, or an
International Court of Habeas Corpus, did not come to fruition. Per-
haps the idea was simply too utopian, given State Department reluc-
tance even to authorize the U.N. to receive petitions from nonstate
parties;212 perhaps it was too impracticable to contemplate that a U.N.
body could require the production of a prisoner (as domestic courts
did in habeas corpus proceedings) or that a U.N. body could actually
handle the number of cases such an international writ of habeas
corpus could produce. 213 Perhaps the (limited) political support that
existed for the idea was primarily linked to its value as an ideological
208 See KUTNER, supra note 13, at 161-66.
209 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
210 Id. at 489-90 (emphasis added).
211 Cf Letter from Carl F. Salans to Luis Kutner, supra note 112 (acknowledging that
the worldwide availability of habeas corpus would be "a giant stride forward" in the effort
to advance international human rights and that "[t]he United States should be in the fore-
front" of efforts to open states up to international scrutiny on human fights issues). But cf.
id. ("However, there are, as you know, some groups in this country which continue to resist
strenuously the notion that protection of certain basic human rights is a proper subject for
the exercise of our treaty power."). Salans also noted that U.S. failures to ratify human
rights treaties limited its efforts to achieve international progress, and that there was still
much "educational spade work" to be done. Id. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, On Amer-
ican Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479 (2003) (discussing how American exceptionalism
in maintaining "double standards" and failing to participate in some international legal
regimes interferes with the United States' capacity to provide exceptional leadership on
human rights).
212 See ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 78-79 (describing the State Department's desire to
prevent the U.N. Commission on Human Rights from reviewing individual petitions).
213 In other respects, as Mark Tushnet has pointed out to me, Kutner's international
writ of habeas corpus was inadequate to remediate or deter state-sponsored "disappear-
ances" of persons, a form of human rights abuse that might be better remedied through
criminal prosecutions of the guilty and/or damage awards to the victims or their families.
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tool in the Cold War;21 4 perhaps the concept itself failed sufficiently to
cabin the proposed remedy in light of Charter commitments to na-
tional state control over matters of "domestic jurisdiction"; or perhaps
Kutner, despite his energy and creativity, was not the right proponent
to build a broad political coalition for implementation of the idea.215
Yet some elements of his vision have been realized, albeit in other
ways. At the same time, habeas corpus in the United States has been
cabined and limited in some rather dramatic ways. Transnational de-
velopments, however, may be leading to a renewed understanding
within the United States of the importance of the writ as a check on
executive power.
A. Habeas Corpus and International Human Rights Outside the
United States
Although there is no mechanism for the issuance of writs of
habeas corpus as a speedy test of the legality of detentions around the
world,2 16 other aspects of Kutner's vision have moved forward: his in-
sistence that the U.N. Charter's commitments to the protection of in-
dividual human rights be realized as law, that treating international
human rights as law requires that those rights be afforded effective
remedies at the international or regional as well as national levels, and
that those remedies be available at the behest of individuals. These
elements of Kutner's vision may be found in the possibility of filing
individual complaints under the optional protocols to some human
rights conventions, the implications of the new International Criminal
Court and ad hoc criminal tribunals, and the trend in some countries
towards incorporating international human rights conventions as en-
forceable domestic law.
1. Optional Protocols for Individual Complaints
In 1966, two major international accords-the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)-were
214 1 thank Dan Ernst for his helpful comment on this possibility.
215 See supra note 22.
216 That is, there is no mechanism that extends to all prisoners, wherever held and
under any government's authority (although in special circumstances the ICJ'sjurisdiction
has been invoked by a state-party to attempt to remedy unlawful detention, e.g., of diplo-
matic personnel, see United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24)). In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), the Court upheld the
jurisdiction of federal courts to consider habeas corpus petitions from prisoners held
under U.S. authority in Guantanamo. Aspects of the Court's reasoning (concerning juris-
diction over the custodian) could extend to prisoners held by U.S. military officials any-
where in the world, see id. at 478-79, see also id. at 498-500 (Scalia, J., dissenting), though
the breadth of Rasul remains to be determined, especially in light of its discussion of the
particular status of Guantanamo, see id. at 480-82.
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opened for signature and, by 1976, enough countries had signed on
to these Covenants for them to enter into force.217 Perhaps more im-
portantly, the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, providing for individ-
ual complaints to be made to the Human Rights Committee, entered
into force in 1976,218 and has been adopted by 104 nations. 219 One of
the key elements of Kutner's vision-the importance of allowing indi-
viduals to make claims directly under international law and before
tribunals outside their own countries if no internal remedies exist or
available internal remedies have been exhausted-has thus come
partly to fruition through the optional protocol procedure. A num-
ber of the claims made under the Optional Protocol involve assertedly
unlawful detention.220
This procedure, however, suffers from many defects, from Kut-
ner's point of view as well as that of contemporary scholars. The pro-
ceedings are lengthy, and the Human Rights Committee is not
authorized to issue binding judgments, but rather only its "views."221
Some countries have quite good records of compliance with these
views, though compliance may take several years; 222 however, one
study finds that states provided remedies in only a small percentage of
the individual cases in which a violation was shown. 223
217 See ICCPR, supra note 177; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3,
1976).
218 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
219 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,. STATUS OF RATI-
FICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RGHTS TREATIES 12 (2004).
220 See, e.g., Smirnova v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 712/1996, U.N.
Human Rights Comm., 81st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/81/D/712/1996 (Aug. 18, 2004).
221 See Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 369, 421 (Philip Alston ed., 1992) (stating that the
Human Rights Committee's "'views'" are not to be understood as strictly binding in law
and cannot be enforced). But cf Gerald Heckman, International Decisions: Ahani v. Canada,
99 Am. J. INr'L L. 669, 671 (2005) (noting that although Canada recently treated the views
of the Human Rights Committee as nonbinding, the Human Rights Committee regarded
its interim measures request as binding).
222 Compare, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, 429, 445, 459, U.N. GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. I, U.N. Doc. A/51/40 (Apr. 13, 1997), available at http://www.
bayefsky.com/general/a_5140vol. i 1996.pdf (noting positive follow-up by France to
findings of violations by the Human Rights Committee in a 1989 decision), with, e.g., Report
of the Human Rights Committee, 180, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/56/40, vol. I (Jan. 10, 2001), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/general/a_56_40_
vol._i_2001.pdf (noting that no follow-up reply had been received from the Russian Feder-
ation to the Human Rights Committee's finding of a violation in connection with a 1997
complaint). For the many inadequacies in the processing of individual complaints under
this and other human rights instruments, see ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS
TRATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 25-26 (2001).
223 BAYEFSKY, supra note 222, at 7 ("[I] n only 20% of individual cases disclosing a viola-
tion, have state parties been prepared to provide a remedy.").
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The ICCPR is not the only human rights treaty to have an op-
tional protocol permitting individual complaints to be received and
reviewed ,224 although typically there are considerably fewer signato-
ries to the optional protocols or provisions permitting individual com-
plaint than to the treaties themselves. For example, the United States
finally ratified the ICCPR in 1992, but not its Optional Protocol. 225
And of the 177 signatories in 2004 to the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) ,226 only
sixty had signed on to its Optional Protocol permitting individual
complaints.227 Nevertheless, the capacity of individuals to file com-
plaints alleging human rights violations by national states and for
those complaints to be heard by some official body with recognized
jurisdiction has increased since Kutner's time.
2. International Criminal Tribunals
Another key development has been the growth of international
criminal tribunals, both on an ad hoc basis, as in the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, and in
the establishment-without participation by the United States-of the
International Criminal Court (ICC).228 In some respects these tribu-
nals are the converse of Kutner's idea for world habeas corpus, focus-
ing not on providing a direct remedy to individuals held in unlawful
detention in violation of basic rights, but rather on providing a crimi-
nal sanction with the possibility of imprisonment against those ac-
cused of some of the most serious breaches of human rights and
humanitarian law.22 9 But these standing international tribunals re-
224 See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999).
225 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
219, at 11.
226 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
227 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 219,
at 11.
228 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (English version) (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute]. The ICC can exercise jurisdiction only over acts occurring within a territory that
has joined the treaty, or against nationals of states that have joined the treaty; its territorial
jurisdiction extends to nationals of nonparticipating states (like the United States) who
commit covered criminal acts within a signatory party's territory. See International Crimi-
nal Court, About the Court, ICC at a Glance, Jurisdiction, http://www.icc-cpi.int/about/at
aglance/jurisdiction.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2005). The ICC's jurisdiction is limited to
"the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole... [includ-
ing] the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes," as more fully de-
fined in the Rome Statute. Id.
229 See supra note 228. Kutner, it should be noted, advocated in favor of an interna-
tional criminal court as well. See, e.g., Luis Kutner, Politicide: The Necessity of an International
Court of CriminalJustice, 2 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 55 (1972).
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present a further extension of the idea that international law directly
reaches the rights and conduct of individuals, which cannot always be
sheltered by claims of state sovereignty. The international criminal
tribunals may also be a more practical, manageable response: Even if
the world community is not in a position to provide individual redress
to the many persons being unlawfully detained (or otherwise sub-
jected to human rights abuses), it can prosecute the worst human
rights offenders, perhaps thereby achieving more deterrence than
would be possible through an individually oriented, but practically un-
available human rights remedy.230
3. Regional Human Rights Protection
Kutner praised the European Convention on Human Rights and
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as models of regional
human rights enforcement.231 In the years since Kutner's first writ-
ings on this subject, the influence of the ECHR has grown, as more
countries have joined the European Convention and as the ECHR's
decisions have come to be referred to by courts beyond its geographic
reach, including the U.S. Supreme Court.23 2 Although the ECHR, in
its first case, rejected a challenge to an assertedly unlawful deten-
tion, 233 the court has subsequently addressed and upheld claims of
unlawful detention as well as many other asserted violations of the
human rights protections of the European Convention. 234
230 While the turn in international human rights law from remedies for individuals to
punishment for wrongdoers may seem in tension with Kutner's emphasis on protecting
human liberty from wrongful detentions, the new international criminal tribunals aspire to
fair procedures and clear standards of liability in ways that respond to Kutner's demand for
international "due process of law." For a discussion, see Patricia M. Wald, ICTYJudicial
Proceedings: An Apprasialfrom Within, 2J. INT'L CRIM.JUSTICE 466 (2004), and Kelly D. Askin,
Reflections on Some of the Most Significant Achievements of the ICTY, 37 NEW ENG. L. Riv. 903,
914 (2003). Cf Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 510, 515-16
(2003) (praising provisions for judicial review of prosecutorial decisions and for judicial
and prosecutorial independence).
231 See, e.g., KUTNER, supra note 13, at 138; cf id. app. VIII at 234 (reprinting statute of
the Council of Europe); Kutner, Ombudsman, supra note 22, at 377 (describing how the
European Convention on Human Rights broadly grants rights of petition).
232 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003).
23-3 See Door-AN, supra note 1, at 194 (discussing Lawless v. Ireland).
234 See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A no. 25) at 66-67
(1978) (finding Britain to have violated Article 3 of the Convention by its "inhuman and
degrading" treatment of Irish detainees); Kremzow v. Austria, 17 Eur. H. R. Rep. 322,
353-54 (1994) (reprinting decision of Sept. 21, 1993) (finding violations of fair trial guar-
antees under Articles 6(1) and (3) (c) when the defendant was not present for an appellate
hearing that resulted in an increase in the severity of his punishment). The European
Convention provides an explicit right to compensation for unlawful detention. See Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 5(5), opened
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force September 3, 1953). Al-
though proceedings before the European Court can be time consuming, court rules of the
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Although European regional enforcement of human rights is the
strongest of its kind, the Inter-American system has been strength-
ened through the American Convention on Human Rights.2 35 At
least twenty countries in the Americas have accepted the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 2 3 6 Both a
commission and the court help enforce this convention. 237 Individu-
als may complain to the commission, and the commission may prose-
cute complaints before the court.238  Regional human rights
enforcement is weaker (to nonexistent) in other parts of the world.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was adopted in
1981 and came into force in 1986, and although it did not at that time
establish a court, it did establish a commission that may consider indi-
vidual complaints. 239
ECHR authorize "interim measures," EUR. CT. H.R. R. 39, available at http://www.echr.coe.
int/NR/rdonlyres/D 1EB31A8-4194-436E-987E-65AC8864BE4F/0/RulesOfCourt.pdf (last
visited Oct. 16, 2005), which the ECHR has recently treated as having real force, see Ma-
matkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99, paras. 92-129 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb.
4, 2005), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=HUdoc-en (holding that
Turkey's failure to implement the ECHR's suggested interim measures, by extraditing the
defendants to Uzbekistan prior to resolution of their challenges in the ECHR, led to a
violation of Article 34 of the European Convention, which secures to individuals the right
to petition the ECHR, by disrupting the petitioners' ability to communicate with their law-
yers and the ECHR and that court's ability to resolve the case through its normal
procedures).
235 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into forceJuly 18, 1978); see alsoAmerican Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of
American States (1948), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic2.htm.
236 See Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights art. 2, O.A.S. Res. 448
(1979), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basicl7.htm; Signatures and Current
State of Ratifications, American Convention on Human Rights, http://www.cidh.oas.org/
Basicos/basic4.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2005); Claudio Grossman, Moving Toward Improved
Human Rights Enforcement in the Americas, ABA HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.abanet.org/irr/
hr/summer00humanrights/grossman.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
237 See Grossman, supra note 236. For a helpful treatment of the complexities of the
Inter-American human rights regimes, in which the commission has authority over two
different human rights instruments (only one of which, the American Declaration, applies
to the United States) and thejurisdiction of the court applies to the American Convention,
see Jo M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 1-13, 340-46 (2003).
238 See Grossman, supra note 236. Grossman reports that in several cases the court has
issued interim relief measures, although there have also been cases in which countries
withdrew from the Convention because they did not want to comply with the court's judg-
ments. See id.
239 See African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights arts. 30, 55-56, adopted
June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force
Oct. 21, 1986). A 1998 protocol providing for an African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights came into force in 2004, although "[t]he statute of the ACHPR has not yet been
promulgated and a seat for the court has yet to be determined." Project on International
Courts and Tribunals, ACHPR, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ACHPR.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2005).
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4. National Law Incorporating International Human Rights as
Binding
In addition to the development of international and transna-
tional enforcement mechanisms, in recent years some countries have
incorporated international human rights treaties into their domestic
law, sometimes treating them as superior to ordinary statutes or of
constitutional stature.240 Argentina, for example, has incorporated
several named human rights treaties into its constitution; 241 Norway
has incorporated the European Convention, the ICCPR, and the
ICESCR into its domestic law as superior to ordinary statutes. 242
Other national courts or constitutions have treated international law
as binding or relevant to domestic adjudication of individual rights
issues. Israel's High Court has in several cases treated international
humanitarian law as judicially enforceable. 243 And South Africa's
1996 Constitution requires the courts to consider international law in
interpreting the South African Constitution's bill of rights. 244 Domes-
tic courts in some nations thus may function to provide for legal en-
forcement of international human rights and, to the extent that the
courts function independently, they may provide some of the kind of
check on unlawful detentions that Kutner sought to locate in an inter-
national tribunal.
B. Habeas Corpus in the United States
In the United States, the availability of the habeas corpus remedy
has gone through dramatic shifts since the 1950s-expansion in the
1960s and contraction in more recent decades. It is now, as a result of
statutory change, a more cabined, limited remedy within the United
States than in the 1960s, when habeas corpus was one of many vehicles
through which federal courts sought to enforce nationally protected
rights against state and local officials. Today, the habeas corpus rem-
edy is under increasing pressure to serve as a vehicle for protecting
240 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98
Am. J. INT'L L. 82, 85 (2004). For a discussion of national incorporation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, see Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 292-312
(1995).
241 See CONST. ARc. [Constitution] § 75(22), available at http://www.biblioteca.jus.gov.
ar/Argentina-Constitution.pdf (in English) (specifying ten international human rights ac-
cords, including the UDHR and the ICCPR, as of "constitutional hierarchy," and providing
that other treaties can attain that status on a two-thirds vote of all members of each house
and that a treaty can only lose its constitutional stature with the same kind of vote).
242 See Carsten Smith, Judicial Review of Parliamentary Legislation: Norway as a European
Pioneer, 2000 PuB. L. 595, 603-04.
243 See, e.g., Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term-Foreword: A Judge on Judging:
The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REv. 16, 100, 152 (2002).
244 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 39.
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human rights not only from errors in the ordinary criminal process,
but also from executive overreaching.
1. Habeas Corpus and Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions
In the 1960s, under the influence of the civil rights movement
and the mistrust of state courts it helped engender, the Supreme
Court dramatically expanded the availability of habeas corpus, ex-
tending it even to some constitutional claims waived in the trial
courts. 2 45 Indeed, some members of the Court came to see habeas
corpus review as a substitute for full federal appellate review of most
state court convictions involving federal constitutional claims.246 But
by the mid-1970s, the tide of mistrust of state courts had turned. In
Stone v. Powell,247 the change was palpable; the Court there held that
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims could not be heard on
federal habeas corpus, unless the state courts denied a full and fair
opportunity to litigate them. 248 Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
stated that there was no reason "now" to think that state courts would
be hostile to federal claims.2 49 In the years that followed, the Supreme
Court led the way in retrenching the scope of federal habeas in cases
such as Teague v. Lane.250
Dissatisfaction with the use of habeas corpus to review state court
convictions-especially in capital cases, in which habeas petitions were
viewed by some as efforts to delay and avoid execution of death
sentences, whether by vacating the punishment or obtaining clem-
ency25 1-led to further Supreme Court decisions restricting the scope
245 See supra text accompanying notes 194-99; see also LuCAs A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN
COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 420-25 (2000).
246 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 511-12 (1976) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (arguing
that it was a "settled principle that for purposes of adjudicating constitutional claims Con-
gress, which has the power to do so under Art. III of the Constitution, has effectively cast
the district courts sitting in habeas in the role of surrogate Supreme Courts" reviewing
state court judgments).
247 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
248 Id. at 494.
249 Id. at 493 n.35 ("Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympa-
thetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state judges in years past, we are
unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to consti-
tutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States." (emphasis added)).
For commentary on this passage from footnote 35 of Powell's opinion, see Robert M.
Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE
L.J. 1035, 1095-1100 (1977).
250 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that new rules of constitutional law developed after a
conviction becomes final on direct review generally cannot be considered as a basis for
habeas corpus relief); see also, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (tightening
procedural default rules).
251 See Larry W. Yackle, The American Bar Association and Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998, at 171, 174-75 (discussing the ABA and the Powell re-
ports and recommendations on habeas reform in the 1980s).
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of review in federal habeas, 252 and then to a legislative response re-
writing the rules for federal habeas petitions in cases arising out of
state court convictions.2 53 The federal Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) for the first time imposed a stat-
ute of limitations on the availability of federal habeas corpus,2 5 4 at
odds with conceptions of the "Great Writ" as an ever-available check
on unjust detention.255  In addition, AEDPA bars federal habeas
corpus relief if a state court has adjudicated the same claim (even if
the state court decision may be erroneous under the law as it exists
when the federal habeas petition is decided), unless that state court's
decision was "contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of,
clearly established" Supreme Court precedents. 256 Other procedural
limitations were also imposed, and many have concluded that navigat-
ing the path to habeas corpus relief on meritorious claims has become
considerably more difficult, even for well-trained lawyers and certainly
for the pro se nonlawyer prisoner. 257
2. Habeas Corpus, Executive Detentions, and Treaty Obligations
If the availability of habeas corpus review of criminal convictions
has been increasingly restricted by procedural and other require-
252 See, e.g., Herrerra v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that the petitioner's
claim of actual innocence, absent an independent constitutional violation, did not consti-
tute a ground for habeas relief); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that
a "cause and prejudice" standard must be met before a federal habeas court may consider a
claim defaulted in the state courts and treating Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), as over-
ruled); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (limiting availability of habeas corpus relief
when a petitioner raises a claim in a successive habeas petition that was not raised in a
prior habeas petition).
253 SeeAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-66 (2000)) [hereinafter "AEDPA"]. See
generally Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 381
(1996) (explaining the provisions of the then-recently passed AEDPA).
254 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); James Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty"? AEDPA and
Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 411, 415-16 (2001).
255 To be sure, prior law permitted the respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding to
seek dismissal on grounds of prejudicial delay, but this essentially judge-made rule had
considerably more flexibility to it than the new statutory limitations period. See, e.g., Vaz-
quez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264 (1986) (discussing former Rule 9).
256 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). The new stat-
ute also restricts federal reconsideration of claims of factual error. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) (2).
257 At this writing, legislation is pending that would further restrict the availability of
federal habeas corpus relief for those challenging detentions resulting from convictions in
the state courts. See Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005);
H.R. 3035, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Sec'y, Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, to Sen. Arlen Specter 2 (Sept. 26, 2005) (on file with
author) (expressing opposition to provisions that would "undermine the traditional role of
the federal courts to hear and decide the merits of claims arising under the Constitu-
tion ... [and] prevent the federal courts from reaching the merits of habeas corpus peti-
tions by adding procedural requirements that may complicate resolution of these cases").
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ments, habeas corpus has nonetheless thus far survived as a means of
testing the legality of executive detentions. Many, though not all, of
these cases arise in proceedings involving aliens-situations in which
the interests of the "world community," or the interests of particular
nations in the treatment of their nationals, may be heightened. In
INS v. St. Cyr,2 58 the Supreme Court affirmed the availability of habeas
corpus review of refusals to waive deportation. 25 9 In Rasul v. Bush,260
the Court upheld the lower courts' federal habeas jurisdiction over
challenges, asserted by noncitizen detainees, to the legality of their
detentions by the U.S. military in Guantanamo. 261 And in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld,262 the Court insisted that war was not a "blank check" for the
President to determine which individuals to detain and held that a
federal habeas court could examine the factual basis for a determina-
tion that a U.S. citizen was an enemy combatant to be held for the
duration of hostilities. 263 Hamdi specifically rejected the govern-
ment's argument that as long as "some evidence" could be identified
in support of the classification, a U.S. citizen classified as an "enemy
combatant" could be indefinitely detained on this basis by the execu-
tive without any judicial review. 264
Unresolved at present are the availability and scope of habeas re-
view of alleged violations of U.S. treaty obligations arising in the
course of a state or local criminal investigation, prosecution or trial.
Medellin v. Dretke involved claims arising from an international treaty
designed to protect foreign nationals from abusive or unlawful deten-
tion by guaranteeing them access to their consular representatives. 265
258 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
259 See id. at 300-01 (refusing to read new statutes restrictingjudicial review over waiver
of deportation decisions to preclude habeas corpus in order to avoid serious questions
under the Suspension Clause); see also, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005) (hold-
ing that habeas corpus relief should be granted to inadmissible aliens who have been de-
tained beyond an authorized period of time).
260 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
261 See id. at 483-84.
262 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
263 See id. at 532-36 (plurality opinion).
264 See id. at 537-38. Cf id. at 538 (leaving open the possibility that an appropriate
military tribunal could meet requirement for review). Hamdi also, in important respects,
sanctioned an expansion of presidential power, upholding the President's authority to clas-
sify U.S. citizens as enemy combatants and to detain them for extended periods in order to
prevent their return to the battlefield, pursuant to a congressional resolution authorizing
"necessary and appropriate force" against "nations, organizations, or persons" responsible
for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States. See id. at 518. Al-
though the power to detain citizens based on their status as members of enemy forces was
upheld in World War 11, see In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946), in that case the
prisoner's status as a member of the Italian Armed Forces was uncontested, the court re-
viewed the merits of the petition, and a declared war among sovereign nations existed. See
also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 572 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that in Exparte Quifin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942), it was uncontested that the defendants were all enemy invaders).
265 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005).
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In 1969, near the end of the period of most attention to Kutner's pro-
posal for world habeas corpus, the United States ratified the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations. 266 Reflecting the position of the
U.S. government in the Oatis case (that the Czechoslovakian govern-
ment should allow U.S. consular officials to visit), 2 6 7 the Vienna Con-
vention provides that a foreign national who is "arrested, in prison,
custody or detention" has rights to be notified that he may communi-
cate with and receive assistance (if offered) from his own nation's con-
sular officers and to communicate with them and receive such
assistance. 268 The United States also ratified the Optional Protocol to
the Vienna Convention, which provides for the submission of disputes
"arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention" to
the "compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice." 269
Although the Vienna Convention is widely regarded as self-exe-
cuting,270 compliance by state and local law enforcement has been at
best sporadic. 271 Violations of the treaty's provisions have led to par-
266 See Vienna Convention, supra note 18; 115 CONG. REc. 30,997 (1969).
267 State Department records reflect that Oatis was arrested on April 23, 1951 and that
on April 26, 1951, the "Embassy sen[t] note requesting consular access and American law-
yer" for Oatis. U.S. Dep't of State, Confidential Briefing Material on the Oatis Case (un-
dated) (on file in State Department Archives on William N. Oatis) (describing events
between April 23, 1951 and July 1951); see also 98 CONG. REc. 4,957 (1952) (statement of
Rep. Rogers) (noting in early May, 1952 that the U.S. Ambassador had been allowed to see
Oatis one week earlier). Consular access issues were of more general concern, arising in
cases other than William Oatis'. For example, according to an amicus brief written by
Joseph Margulies, of the MacArthur Justice Center of the University of Chicago Law
School, in 1954 the United States brought an action in the International Court ofJustice
against Hungary and the Soviet Union, accusing them of violating international law by
failing to allow consular access to U.S. airmen brought down over Hungary (in late 1951),
tried in secret and sentenced to prison. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Ambassador L. Bruce
Laingen et al. in Support of Petitioner at 10-14, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928).
The ICJ rejected the case because Hungary and the Soviet Union had not consented to its
jurisdiction. See id. at 13-14 (citing, inter alia, Application Instituting Proceedings and
Pleadings (U.S. v. Hungary; U.S. v. U.S.S.R), 1953 I.C.J. Pleadings (Treatment in Hungary
of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America) annex I at 36 (Feb. 16, 1954)).
268 Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 36(1).
269 Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes art. 1, done
Apr. 24, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. The United States has since withdrawn
from this Optional Protocol. See supra note 19.
270 See, e.g., Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1039 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the State Department and lower courts have treated the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations as self-executing in the sense that it did not require implementing legis-
lation to have legal effect).
271 See, e.g., Avena, 43 I.L.M. 581, supra note 18, at 621, para. 149 (noting that despite
good faith efforts on behalf of the U.S. federal government since 1998 to inform state and
local authorities of U.S. obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
.there remain a substantial number of cases of failure" to fulfill the treaty obligations of
consular notification and access); Brief of Former United States Diplomats as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 17, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928) [hereinafter Former
Diplomats Brief] (referring to "the states' persistent practice of violating the Vienna
Convention").
350
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ticular tensions in capital cases, as world opinion shifted against the
death penalty and foreign embassies' efforts to assist their nationals
charged with capital offenses were thwarted by failures to notify the
defendants of their consular rights. 272 In Breard v. Greene,2 73 the Su-
preme Court upheld the permissibility of a state's reliance on its pro-
cedural default rules to bar consideration of Vienna Convention
violations. And notwithstanding the request of the ICJ that the
United States "'take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel
Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these
proceedings, "274 neither the Supreme Court nor the federal govern-
ment sought to require the state to refrain from executing the defen-
dant pending final resolution of the ICJ proceedings brought by
Paraguay on behalf of Breard.275
272 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Bar Associations and Human Rights Organizations in
Support of Petitioner at 23-24, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928) (describing Mex-
ico's efforts to provide assistance to its nationals detained in the United States, particularly
when a severe penalty may be imposed); Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and
Members of the International Community in Support of Petitioner at 1, Medellin, 125 S. Ct.
2088 (No. 04-5928) (urging that petition for certiorari be granted and noting that the EU's
position "in securing compliance" with Article 36 of the Convention "has been expressed
to the Goverment of the United States through specific demarches in cases involving indi-
vidual foreign nationals who have been deprived of their rights under Article 36"); Former
Diplomats Brief, supra note 271, at 15-16 (noting that "our allies have strenously requested
review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of their citizens" when Vienna
Convention rights have been violated in capital cases and that both Mexico and Canada
have said that the failure of U.S. states to comply with these obligations has "'strain [ed]'
bilateral relations" (alteration in original)).
273 523 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1998) (per curiam). Written quickly and in an unusual pro-
cedural posture on the eve of Breard's execution, the Court's opinion rests on a number of
grounds, including a federal statutory bar to the holding of an evidentiary hearing found
in the AEDPA, see id. at 376-77, and the unlikelihood that Breard could show prejudice, id.
at 377, and thus caution in characterizing its holding is required. Breard pre-dated the
ICJ's conclusion that in some cases the Vienna Convention requires judicial consideration
and review, notwithstanding procedural default at trial. See infra note 274. The Court has
recently granted certiorari in two cases that may provide an opportunity to reconsider as-
pects of Breard. See infra note 285.
274 Breard, 523 U.S. at 374 (quoting the ICJ order). In the years following Breard, the
ICJ held that it had power to issue interim relief ("provisional measures") with which par-
ties to the Optional Protocol were bound to comply, and concluded that U.S. procedural
default rules could not be applied to bar consideration of certain Vienna Convention
claims as a matter of treaty interpretation. See LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J.
497, 501-03, 515-16 (June 27); Avena, 43 I.L.M. 581, supra note 18, at 613, 617-18, 619-20,
624-25, paras. 113, 133-34, 139-40, 153. The ICJ essentially held that although the consu-
lar access treaty recognizes that each state may follow its own procedural rules in imple-
menting the consular notification and access rights, it could not use those rules to refuse to
give "full effect" to the treaty. See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 36(2) (stating that
the rights established in Article 36(1) "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights ac-
corded under this Article are intended").
275 The U.S. government at the time took the position that it could only request, not
require, the state to comply with the request of the ICJ. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390 (A-738), 97-8214
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Medellfn v. Dretke, like Breard, presented issues arising out of a
state's failure to notify a capital defendant of his consular rights.
2 7 6
Six weeks after Medellin's conviction and death sentence were af-
firmed on appeal, Mexican consular officials became aware of his ar-
rest and conviction and began to offer assistance.2 77 Mexico also
invoked the jurisdiction of the ICJ against the United States under the
(A-732)) ("The 'measures at [the United States'] disposal' under our Constitution may in
some cases include only persuasion-such as the Secretary of State's request to the Gover-
nor of Virginia to stay Breard's execution-and not legal compulsion through the judicial
system. That is the situation here."). A year later, in Federal Republic of Germany v. United
States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999), the Court denied leave to file an original suit against the
United States or the governor of Arizona by Germany, which sought to prevent the execu-
tion of its national Walter LaGrand, in light of the asserted failure of Arizona authorities to
provide the required consular notifications. In LaGrand's case, as in Breard's, the ICJ had
"issued an order 'indicating' that the 'United States should take all measures at its disposal
to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these [ICJ]
proceedings.'" Id. at 113 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (quoting ICJ order) (alterations in origi-
nal). Once again, the position of the United States was to oppose a stay. According to
Justice Breyer, the Solicitor General by letter indicated "his view [that] the 'Vienna Con-
vention does not furnish a basis for this Court to grant a stay of execution,' and 'an order
of the International Court of Justice indicating provisional measures is not binding and
does not furnish a basis for judicial relief."' Id. In Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003),
Justice Breyer dissented from denial of certiorari in yet another case in which a foreign
national (from Mexico) was prosecuted in a capital case by a state (Oklahoma) that failed
to provide the required consular notifications. Since the decision of the U.S. Court in
Federal Republic of Germany, the ICJ, in an action brought on behalf of LaGrand, held that its
own provisional orders were-contrary to the prior view of the U.S. Solicitor General-
binding on parties to the Optional Protocol. See Torres, 540 U.S. at 1038-40 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). And in the then-pending Avena case brought by Mex-
ico in the ICJ on behalf of its nationals (including Torres), Justice Breyer asserted, the ICJ
had issued a provisional order indicating that the United States should not proceed with
execution of Mexican nationals who did not receive consular notifications prior to being
sentenced to death. Torres, 540 U.S. at 1040. Justice Breyer argued that the claims made by
Torres were substantial enough that depending on what the ICJ did in Torres's case, he
might vote to grant certiorari, and thus he would have deferred disposition of the writ
pending the ICJ decision. Id. at 1041. The Court, however, simply denied certiorari. Id. at
1035.
276 Medellin, a Mexican national living in the United States, was sentenced to death
following his conviction in 1994 of the brutal rape-murders of two minors committed when
the defendant himself was eighteen years old. See Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2089; Brief for
Petitioner at 5, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928). The police did not advise Medellin
of his rights under the Vienna Convention to have his consul notified or to communicate
with his consul. Brief for Petitioner, supra at 5. Mexico was unaware of the prosecution
against Medellin and thus did not communicate with, visit, or offer legal representation to
its national, as it was entitled to do under the Vienna Convention. See id. 5-6; Vienna
Convention, supra note 18, art. 36(1)(c). Medellin's court-appointed attorney did not ob-
ject to the Vienna Convention violation during the course of the state court trial proceed-
ings, or on direct review of the conviction. See Brief for Petitioner, supra, at 7. Indeed,
according to the Petitioner's Brief, Medellin's trial court lawyer was suspended from the
practice of law for an ethical violation during the period of trial preparation for Medellin's
case, called no witnesses during the guilt phase, and presented so little evidence in the
penalty phase that it lasted less than two hours. Id. at 6 n.5. Mexico's practice in capital
cases involving its nationals, petitioner explained, was to provide substantial legal assis-
tance. Id. at 5-6 & n.4.
277 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 276, at 6.
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Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, on behalf of Medellin
and more than fifty other Mexican nationals who, it asserted, had
been sentenced to death in the United States without having been
timely notified of their rights to consular assistance.2 78 In Avena, the
ICJ found that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention
rights of fifty-one Mexican nationals-including Medellin. 279 As to
remedy, the ICJ rejected Mexico's argument that the violations re-
quired vacatur and annulment of the convictions and sentences with-
out regard to prejudice. 28°1 Likewise, however, the ICJ rejected the
United States' argument that application of ordinary procedural rules
to bar consideration of Vienna Convention claims not raised at trial
was consistent with Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention.281 Re-
jecting the United States' further argument that executive clemency
was an adequate remedy, 282 the ICJ held that the required remedy was
judicial review and reconsideration of the claims, 2 3 notwithstanding
procedural default at trial, of whether a Treaty violation so prejudiced
the trial or sentence to warrant further relief.284
Medellin was unsuccessful in state postconviction proceedings
and in the federal district court on habeas review. The Fifth Circuit
denied a certificate of appealability, concluding inter alia that, the ICJ
decisions in LaGrand and Avena notwithstanding, the controlling law
was that of the U.S. Supreme Court in Breard.285 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on whether the Avena judgment and the United
States' treaty obligations or principles of comity required U.S. courts
to give effect to the Avenajudgment. 28 6 After the petitioners' briefs
were filed, the case took an unexpected turn: The President of the
United States signed a Memorandum for the Attorney General, on
"Compliance with the Decision of the International Court ofJustice in
Avena," declaring that "the United States will discharge its interna-
278 See Avena, 43 I.L.M. 581, supra note 18, at 591, para. 14.
279 See id. at 623, para. 153(4).
280 See id. at 614-16, paras. 115-27.
281 See id. at 617-18, paras. 131-34.
282 See id. at 619-20, paras. 142-43.
283 See id. at 619, 624-25, paras. 138-40, 153(11).
284 See id. at 613, 615, 617-18, paras. 113, 121, 133-34.
285 Medellfn v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279-80 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686
(2004), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005). The court of appeals
also concluded, under its own prior case law, that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
does not create privately enforceable rights. See 371 F.3d at 280. The Supreme Court has
recently granted certiorari in two other cases presenting this and other questions concern-
ing the Vienna Convention. See Bustillo v. Johnson, Case No. 042023 (Va., Mar. 7, 2005),
cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-51) (limiting grant to question
1); State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S.
Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 04-10566) (limiting grant to questions I and 2).
286 See Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (order granting certiorari); Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at i, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928).
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tional obligations under the [ICJ] decision [in Avena] ... by having
State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general
principles of comity" in the fifty-one specific cases before the ICJ, in-
cluding Medellfn's. 287 In response, Medellfn filed a new habeas peti-
tion in state court and the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted,288 thus avoiding for the time a
judicial decision on whether the ICJ judgment would be given effect.
Although the Court did not reach the merits, several of the opin-
ions in the case suggest that the application of the ICJ judgment
raised difficult questions, including whether procedural barriers
based on either state law or the federal habeas corpus statute would
require the federal courts to refuse relief.289 For example, among the
287 The Memorandum, dated February 28, 2005, reads in full:
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions (the "Convention") and the Convention's Optional Protocol Concern-
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol), which
gives the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction to decide disputes
concerning the "interpretation and application" of the Convention.
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the
United States will discharge its international obligations under the decision
of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) (Avena),
2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give effect to the decision in
accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexi-
can nationals addressed in that decision.
Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005),
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, app. 2, at 8a, Medel-
lin, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928) [hereinafter Brief for the United States in Medellin].
288 Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2092 & n.4. Among the reasons given in the per curiam
opinion for the five to four vote in favor of dismissal were that (1) Medellfn might obtain
relief on his claims in his new state court petition (filed four days before oral argument,
based on the President's Memorandum), and (2) there were a number of possible "hur-
dles" to reaching the merits of the claims concerning the effect of the ICJ judgment, in-
cluding (a) whether Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994) (holding that statutory claims are
not cognizable on federal habeas unless they amount to a fundamental defect in the pro-
ceedings), bars consideration of the treaty claim; (b) whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which
bars habeas relief on claims adjudicated in state court unless the state court decision was
contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court decisions, would bar federal
habeas review; (c) whether the Court's "new rule" case law, of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), which limits federal habeas corpus relief on "new" claims, bars consideration of the
claim; (d) whether a treaty violation could meet the standard for the certificate of appeala-
bility now necessary under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), which requires "a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right"; and (e) whether Medellfn could show exhaustion of
state court remedies. Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2089-92.
289 See supra note 288. Justice Ginsburg noted in her separate concurrence that she
would have stayed the Fifth Circuit proceedings while Medellfn pursued his claim in the
Texas state courts, but that this result did not garner sufficient votes. See Medellin, 125 S.
Ct. at 2093 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Absent a stay, Justice Ginsburg (joined in her dis-
cussion on this point by Justice Scalia) rejected arguments for an immediate remand, con-
cluding that the claims should go forward in the state courts, followed by an opportunity
for the Court to rule "definitively" on the merits of the treaty claim unencumbered by the
procedural limitations on federal habeas corpus referred to in the per curiam opinion. Id.
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many issues left unresolved was whether the AEDPA would preclude
appellate review of Medellin's treaty-based claims. One of the new
statutory limitations on federal habeas, enacted as part of AEDPA,
prohibits appeals from the district courts in habeas challenges to state
court criminal convictions without a certificate of appealability.2 9 0
And it provides that a certificate of appealability "may issue ... only if
the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a consti-
tutional right."29 ' This language, the state and federal governments
argued in their Medellfn briefs, 29 2 did not allow for appeals of treaty-
based claims, even though the federal district courts have habeas juris-
diction over such claims.29 3 The logical implication of this executive
branch interpretation is that the statute would allow the more than
Justice O'Connor, dissenting (and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer), would
have remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit for consideration of the issues in light of the
President's determination, arguing that it was "unsound to avoid questions of national im-
portance when they are bound to recur," and noting that states' noncompliance with the
Vienna Convention has been a "vexing problem[,] . . . especially worrisome in capital
cases." Id. at 2096 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Her dissent argued, inter alia, that Texas
had waived objection to the certificate of appealability as not involving a constitutional
question under § 2254(c) (2), id. at 2099; that the Texas courts' decisions were plainly con-
trary to prior Supreme Court law on the question of whether individuals could assert treaty
claims, and thus such claims were not barred by § 2254(d), id. at 2099-2100; that the de-
nial of the certificate of appealability should be vacated because the question of the bind-
ing effect of the ICJ determination raises an important issue on which reasonable jurists
could disagree, id. at 2102; and that the question whether comity should extend to the
judgment raised two other fairly debatable questions that were grounds for a certificate of
appealability: "whether the Vienna Convention creates judicially enforceable rights and
whether it sometimes trumps state procedural default rules," id. (Justice Ginsburg ques-
tioned whether the comity claim put in issue these two questions. See id. at 2094 n.2 (Gins-
burg, J., concurring); id. at 2102 n.2 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).) justices Souter and
Breyer also wrote separate dissents. See id. at 2105-07 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
2107-08 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).
290 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2000). According to Justice O'Connor's dissent, however,
Texas did not raise the issue either in the Fifth Circuit or in opposition to certiorari,
though there is a question whether the limitation is waivable. See Medellfn, 125 S. Ct. at
2098 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
291 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2) (emphasis added). Note that the pre-AEDPA statute did
not state the standard for obtaining a certificate of probable cause to appeal (the predeces-
sor to the certificate of appealability), which had been judicially interpreted to require a
substantial showing that a "'federal right"' had been denied. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 480 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).
292 Respondent's Brief at 8-11, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (No. 04-5928); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in Medellin, supra note 287, at 11-15.
293 The federal government argued that the language of § 2253(c) was in contrast to
other portions of the federal habeas statutes, which explicitly refer to the availability of
habeas corpus where a federal treaty has been violated. See Brief for the United States in
Medellfn, supra note 287, at 13; § 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) ("The Supreme Court, a justice
thereof, a circuitjudge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.").
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600 district court judges294 in the United States each to have the final
word on whether treaty rights, raised in a federal habeas petition,
were violated-a somewhat implausible understanding of likely con-
gressional purpose.2 95 A basic premise of the constitutional system
has long been that appellate review of state court decisions is particu-
larly important where treaty rights are asserted, both to assure a uni-
formity of interpretation and to minimize the possibilities of error in
sensitive areas affecting foreign relations;29 6 appellate review of fed-
eral district court decisions may serve similar functions. Moreover,
under the Charming Betsy canon, statutes are to be construed, when
possible, as consistent with international law.2 97 Whether denial of ap-
pellate review of federal district court decisions on habeas corpus writs
involving treaty violations could itself violate the treaty (in some cir-
cumstances) is a complex question; but if it were so regarded, the
Charming Betsy canon would provide a further reason to avoid (if fairly
possible) interpreting the statute to bar review of treaty claims in the
absence of a very clear statement that this was Congress's intent. 298
294 JUDGESHIP ANALYSIS STAFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HISTORY OF FEDERAL
JUDGESHIPS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tableh.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 18, 2005) (showing 667 authorized district court judgeships in 2004).
295 In a different context involving an underlying constitutional claim, the Court re-
jected efforts narrowly to construe § 2253(c)(2). See Slack, 529 U.S. at 478 (rejecting the
argument that when the district court denied habeas relief as to a constitutional claim on
procedural grounds, without reaching the merits, no certificate of appealability could is-
sue). The Court concluded that a certificate "should issue ... if the prisoner shows, at
least, thatjurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right and ... whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling." Id. Because Slack did raise a constitutional claim, the case is plainly
not controlling on whether a treaty claim can be heard on a certificate of appealability, but
the case suggests some willingness to avoid appeal-precluding constructions of the certifi-
cate-of-appealability requirement.
296 See Martin v. Hunter's Lesseee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334-35, 347-48 (1816).
While it is true that habeas corpus is not an appeal from a state courtjudgment, aspects of
federal habeas do function to correct state court errors on important issues of federal law
affecting liberty. The question raised here is whether Congress would have intended that
district court decisions on treaty claims be final and ineligible for review by means of a
certificate of appealability (with only the remote possibility of review by orginal petition in
the Supreme Court, see infra text at notes 323-24).
297 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains . . . ."); see also F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.
A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (referring to this language from Charming Betsy).
298 Under the domestic law of the United States, a later-enacted statute trumps a
treaty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 115 ("An act of Congress
supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement
as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provi-
sion is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.").
The Charming Betsy canon might, however, caution a court not to lightdy assume Congress's
intent to override a treaty, especially if the statue does not refer to it. If the state courts
were closed to hearing the treaty claims, a statute closing off federal review might well be
deemed an interference with treaty rights, though whether barring appellate review (once
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3. Habeas Corpus and Executive Lawmaking
Broader issues concerning executive lawmaking arise from the
President's Memorandum determination concerning how the United
States would comply with the ICJ's decision in Avena.2 99 Although the
Medellin Court did not reach the merits, the executive branch's posi-
tion in that case reveals a complex set of ambivalent possibilities about
habeas corpus, law, and courts-possibilities that reveal the potential
tensions between increasing claims by the executive branch of execu-
tive lawmaking powers and the function of the writ of habeas corpus.
The U.S. government argued in Medellin that the President's posi-
tion was not based on the Vienna Convention, nor was it based, as a
legal matter, on the ICJ's interpretation of that treaty in Avena. As the
Solicitor General's brief explained,
The President's determination, which means that procedural de-
fault rules may not prevent review and reconsideration for the 51
individuals identified in Avena, is emphatically not premised on a
different interpretation of the Vienna Convention. To the con-
trary... the Executive Branch regards the Court's holding in Breard
as controlling on that issue.30 0
Nonetheless, the brief continued, the President had determined "pur-
suant to his authority under the U.N. Charter and Article II of the
Constitution," that "the foreign policy interests of the United States in
meeting its international obligations and protecting Americans
abroad require the ICJ's decision to be enforced without regard to the
merits of the ICJ's interpretation of the Vienna Convention.
30 1
On the one hand, the President's position could be seen as a vin-
dication of the importance of habeas corpus, or of postconviction re-
lief more generally. The presumptive availability of postconviction
relief in the state courts gave the President a forum to which to direct
adjudication. The tradition of postconviction review of detention-
that there should be a remedy available to test the legality of restraints
on liberty-is reflected in the availability of some form of postconvic-
a federal court has heard the claim) would violate the treaty is still at best unclear, and
might turn on an assessment of whether in a particular case its application had the effect of
"preventing 'full effect [from being] given to the purposes for which the rights accorded
under this article are intended."' LaGrand Case (Germany v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497
(para. 91) (June 27). Other Article III issues, arising from the Constitution's language that
there be a single Supreme Court, may arise if the federal district courts are treated as the
completely final decision-makers on issues of federal statutory or treaty law. These are
complex questions of federal courts law that cannot be fully addressed here.
299 See supra note 287.
300 Brief for the United States in Medellin, supra note 287, at 48.
301 Id.
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tion relief in all of the states,302 as well as in the federal habeas corpus
writ. The President's invocation of the legal process of the state courts
could be understood as affirming the importance of this remedy. On
the other hand, the President's determination, with its designation of
state fora for the habeas claims, could also be seen as undermining
the significance of federal habeas corpus as a remedy for aliens held in
violation of international legal requirements and, given the differ-
ences between state courtjudges (often elected) and tenure-protected
federal judges,30 3 as undermining the likely efficacy of the judicial fo-
rum being provided..3 0 4
More generally with respect to the rule of law, the President's
determination has conflicting valences. Submission of the executive
to judicial authority is a hallmark of the rule of law; there is perhaps
no greater demonstration of fealty to the rule of law than for an exec-
utive to require compliance with a decision with which it vehemently
disagrees. 31 15 The President's Memorandum, in some contrast to the
302 See Clive A. Stafford Smith & Rhmy Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending that Death
Row Prisoners Can Represent Themselves in State Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 45 Lov. L.
REv. 55, 57 & n.9 (1999).
303 See, e.g., Steven B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759 (1995). Cf
Brief of the States of Alabama, Montana, Nevada and New Mexico as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondent at 30, Ex parte Medellfn, No. AP-75,207 (Tex. Ct. Crim. Appeals) (filed
Aug. 31, 2005) (noting political accountability concerns in requiring state courts to take
the highly unpopular step of "granting a reprieve to a condemned murderer-especially at
the behest" of a foreign court decision).
304 On the other hand, it is possible that the state courts were chosen because they
might be more efficacious: The AEDPA controls the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
in habeas, but not of the state courts. If Congress were understood by a later enacted law
to have limited federal habeas jurisdiction with respect to a prior treaty, see Breard v.
Green, 523 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1998), then state courts have a further possible advantage:
State law-unlike a federal statute-cannot trump a federal treaty, and accordingly, state
courts could more readily exercise jurisdiction (an argument in some tension with the
government position that it is the President's determination, rather than the Treaty, which
provides the controlling law). The government's reliance in Medellin on 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), see supra note 288, lends force to the possibility that, in some respects, state
courts would face fewer jurisdictional barriers to considering the petition. See Respon-
dent's Brief, supra note 292, at 11; Brief for the United States in Medellin, supra note 287, at
15-17. The briefs argued that the controlling Supreme Court precedent was Breard v.
Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), which held that ordinary state procedural default rules could
apply to violations of the Vienna Convention; the state court's decision was thus consistent
with, not contrary to, Breard and, the argument goes, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) forbids federal
habeas relief. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 292, at 5, 11; Brief for the United States in
Medellfn, supra note 287, at 15-17. This "habeas corpus with blinders" approach, which
requires federal habeas courts to ignore what the law currently is, derives from the Court's
decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), as well as from 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). For
questions about the constitutionality of § 2254(d), see, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction:
Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts-Opposition, Agreement,
and Hierarchy, 86 GEo. LJ. 2445, 2467-70 (1998).
305 Cf KlARMAN, supra note 183, at 324 (noting that "President Eisenhower repeatedly
refused to say whether he endorsed" Brown v. Board of Education, arguing that it was his duty
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position of the federal government in Breard,3116 could be seen as an
advance toward the rule of law, to the extent that the rule of law re-
quires judicial judgments to be respected and enforced. On the other
hand, it might be argued that the President's Memorandum is incon-
sistent with the rule of law in several respects, the most important one
being that the Memorandum does not say that the Vienna Convention
or the Avena judgment have legally binding domestic effect in U.S.
courts.t 1 7 To the contrary, the tenor of its language as amplified in
the U.S. government's brief, implies that the President's decision is
not based on what the law-independent of the office of the Presi-
dent-requires, but on what he as President believes to be in the "for-
eign policy interests" of the country.30 8 The language of the
declaration, in other words, suggests that it is for the President, not
the courts, to decide whether to give effect to the Avena decision-
and executive discretion about whether to comply with a judgment
to "enforce Court decisions, not to approve or disapprove them," even though Eisenhower
did call out federal troops to enforce desegregation orders in Little Rock).
306 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 275, at 46-47 (indicat-
ing that the United States could only request, not require, state compliance with the ICJ's
order indicating provisional measures). Because the United States viewed the provisional
orders in Breard as nonbinding requests (a view later rejected by the ICJ), rather than an
obligatory judgment, the government's position in the two cases may be reconcilable. But
cf Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Breard and the Federal Power to Require Compliance with ICJ Orders
of Provisional Measures, 92 Am. J. INT'L L. 683 (1998) (arguing that even if the provisional
measures, issued by the ICJ in Paraguay's case concerning Breard, were not binding, the
President had authority to issue an executive order requiring compliance with those provi-
sional measures by delaying execution of the death sentence).
307 While acknowledging that the Avenajudgment creates an international obligation
for the United States, the government's position appears to be that the Optional Protocol
to the Vienna Convention does not impose an obligation to comply with the ICJjudgment,
and, to the extent that Article 94 of the U.N. Charter contemplates such an obligation, the
only remedy it provides for noncompliance is through a vote in the Security Council. See
Brief for the United States in Medellin, supra note 287, at 33-37; id. at 35 (asserting that
"Article 94(2) envisions that the political branches of a Nation may choose not to comply
with an ICJ decision, and provides that, in that event, recourse to the Security Council is
the sole remedy" and that "[p]rivate judicial enforcement" of ICJ decisions in domestic
courts "is incompatible with that enforcement structure"). The government's position fur-
ther seems to be that the President not only has the power to decide how the United States
will comply with an ICJjudgment under a treaty to which the United States is signatory, but
also, at least in some circumstances, whether the United States will comply, see id. at 40-42-
a position in tension with the Supremacy Clause. If the President's claim were that the
U.N. Charter, as a matter of treaty law, contemplates that it is exclusively for the President
to decide, see id. at 42 (referring to Article 94), then there are at least two further ques-
tions: whether this is a correct understanding of the treaty and, if so, whether treaty law can
constitutionally allocate decision-making power over such issues to the President acting
alone. If, on the other hand, the President's claim is that it is for the President to decide
under the Constitution whether to give effect to treaties and international judgments re-
suiting from and contemplated by treaties, then that too raises a domestic constitutional
question, whether this presidential power is in some way a gloss on the implication of the
Supremacy Clause that treaties are law for the courts to apply. See also infra note 309.
•30o8 See supra text at notes 300-01. For the text of the President's Memorandum, see
supra note 287.
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seems at odds with prevailing concepts of what the rule of law
means.
309
The President's Memorandum also assumes that the President
has power to set aside otherwise lawful state court procedural rules.310
As the federal government's brief in Medellin makes clear, the Presi-
dent was "emphatically not" taking action in the belief that the Vienna
Convention legally required him to do so, but rather based on his
determination of "the foreign policy interests of the United States in
meeting its international obligations and protecting Americans
abroad .... ,,3" The notion that the President can himself decide to
set aside the rules of a court for reasons of foreign policy raises addi-
tional concerns for the rule of law31 2 and, in the context of state
309 For a helpful discussion of the rule of law, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of
Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1997). A highly formalist
definition, i.e., that "the law" places compliance with legal judgments in the President's
discretion, would rob the concept of the rule of law of mtch (if any) independent, con-
straining force. A distinct issue is whether Congress should have decided how the United
States should comply with the Avenajudgment-must some forms of lawmaking occur in
the legislative process? The Solicitor General's Brief in Medellin asserts that federal statutes
implicitly recognize the President's "lead role" in determining how to respond to an ICJ
decision. Brief for the United States in Medellin, supra note 287, at 40. It is unclear
whether this "lead role" is based directly in the Constitution or derives from delegations of
authority embodied in federal statutes (or the U.N. Charter, see supra note 307). In either
case, the basis for the claim is subject to serious debate. The United States agreed to the
Charter, see 91 CONG. REC. 8189-90 (1945), and the Charter states that signatories "un-
dertak[e] to comply with" decisions of the ICJ, U.N. Charter art. 94. While Congress did
enact statutes authorizing the President to appoint persons to represent the United States
in the United Nations and specifying that such representatives shall "at all times, act in
accordance with the instructions of the President," see 22 U.S.C. §§ 287, 287a (2000), do
these statutes, or the Constitution, authorize the President to decide how binding an ICJ
judgment is? How to enforce it? To override state procedural rules to give effect to an ICJ
judgment that (as the President sees is) does not, of its own force, have such a
requirement?
310 See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Attorney General, supra
note 287. The President's memorandum might be viewed as consonant with the fact that
federal habeas law-both statutory and judicially developed-has long insisted that prison-
ers challenging their state court convictions exhaust state remedies on each federal claim
before petitioning a federal court. See supra note 42; see also supra note 288. But there is a
difference between requiring petitioners to exhaust available state court remedies and re-
quiing state courts to ignore their own procedural rules. Moreover, the case had been
pending in the federal court of appeals, to which four justices would have remanded the
case for reconsideration. See supra note 289 (describing justice O'Connor's dissent). The
President's determination to have the state courts resolve the issue, even though arguably
significant legal reasons may exist for the choice, see supra this note and note 304, thus
raises at least a possibility of executive branch forum shopping. See supra notes 199, 303.
311 Brief for the United States in Medellin, supra note 287, at 48.
312 The legislative authority of Congress to overcome state procedural rules is itself
contested, though the case law establishes a fairly wide swathe in which federal procedural
rules will trump state procedural rules with respect to federal claims. See, e.g., Felder v.
Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359
(1952). When federal legislation is enacted, at least in theory states have opportunities in
the national legislative process to seek protection of state interests, e.g., in their own proce-
dural systems. Here, however, Congress has made no decision. Cf Curtis A. Bradley &
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courts, federalism (although American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi3 1 3
may have gone some of the way toward this conclusion).314 And if the
President has authority to insist that state courts hear habeas claims
barred by their ordinary rules, would this imply presidential authority
to bar courts from hearing habeas claims otherwise within their
jurisdiction?31 5
Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Mod-
ern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815, 868-69 (1997) (arguing that the "plain statement"
requirement for legislation that intrudes on areas of traditional state concern supports a
more restrained role for courts in developing federal common law rules concerning cus-
tomary international law); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary Interna-
tional Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 400-04 (2002) (arguing that judicial development of
customary international law avoids the procedural protections afforded the states by the
federal lawmaking process). See also supra note 309.
313 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that a state law requiring insurance companies to
disclose information about Holocaust-era policies was preempted by the President's for-
eign policy manifested in executive agreements with foreign nations to establish an alterna-
tive method of resolving claims relating to those policies).
314 Prior cases, involving presidential power to engage in claims settlement or respond
to emergencies, are inapposite, see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981),
and Garamendi itself may be distinguishable. Although space does not allow full treatment,
I note that in contrast to the possible preemption of state court procedural law effected by
the President's Memorandum, the California law at issue in Garamendi targeted activities
that occurred in foreign nations. See 539 U.S. at 408-10. In issuing the Memorandum
during the Medellin litigation, moreover, the President was not acting in an area of tradi-
tional executive branch authority (as in monetary claims settlements), nor pursuant to an
executive agreement with Mexico (however much a formality such an agreement, as to
state court proceedings, may have been). Finally, in Garamendi, the Court implied that the
state's interest was undifferentiated from the larger national interest in vindicating the
ights of U.S. citizens with respect to the Holocaust-era insurance. See id. at 426-27. Given
the longstanding doctrines, such as the "independent and adequate" state ground rule, see,
e.g., Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392-93 (2004), that are designed to recognize the role
of the state courts in the federal system, the Court might treat the interests of the states in
the procedural integrity of their own criminal justice systems differently than the state's
interest at issue in Caramendi.
315 This question may be particularly pressing with respect to executive detentions.
Note that the U.S. government in lower court litigation took strong positions against judi-
cial review of military detentions. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir.
2002) (describing, but not accepting, the government's argument that a court may not
review the military's decision to designate a citizen as an enemy combatant). In Dames &
Moore v. Regan, the Court upheld an executive agreement that suspended (in effect termi-
nating) litigation of private claims in U.S. courts. 453 U.S. at 675-88. Dames & Moore
involved civil, commercial claims; by analogy could the President suspend the hearing of
habeas corpus claims? The Suspension Clause (by itself or with other parts of the Constitu-
tion, including the Due Process Clause) might be read to impose limits on presidential
power to foreclose habeas relief otherwise available under state or federal law (except pur-
suant to a constitutional suspension) and thus might provide a basis for developing doc-
trine that would permit executive branch lawmaking to open, but not close, access to
adjudication of habeas corpus claims. On the original meaning of the Suspension Clause,
authorities are divided. See generally Trevor Morrison, Hamdi's Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as
Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 428 n.99 (2005) (collecting authorities). There is,
however, substantial support for the proposition that "[a]t its historical core, the writ of
habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it
is in that context that its protections have been strongest." INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (quoting this language from St.
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Finally, the President's Memorandum was written so as to avoid
any implication that the Vienna Convention or the Avena judgment
would apply directly to require judicial consideration of the claims of
persons not named in the Avena proceedings. In trying to so limit the
effect of the Avenajudgment, the U.S. government was seeking to as-
sure the judgment would not be extended to other prisoners, similarly
situated except that their claims were not raised by Mexico in
Avena.3 16 The subsequent withdrawal of the United States from the
Optional Protocol confirms the effort to cabin the effect of the ICJ
judgment. 17 But this situation also raises a rule-of-law question: If the
essence of the rule of law is treating like cases alike, then the limita-
tion of full review to the fifty-one individuals named in Avena raises
concerns of equality for other foreign nationals similarly deprived of
the opportunity to communicate with their consul and seek consular
assistance.
The President's Memorandum, then, has dual and conflicting va-
lences for the rule of law and the role of courts. The Memorandum
can be seen as at once an acknowledgment of and a resistance to law,
an acknowledgment of and a resistance to a distinctively judicial
power to apply treaty law in habeas corpus proceedings. It is the dis-
tinctively adjudicatory nature of the writ of habeas corpus on which
Kutner-and many others-have relied in defending habeas corpus
as a bulwark of liberty, for the distinctly adjudicatory character implies
the independence of the courts in decision making. To the extent
that habeas operates within "law," and that "law" is made and changed
by a single head of state, the more difficult it is to carry out this his-
toric task. And to the extent that the executive branch can choose the
judges to decide particular cases-for example, by declaring that
Cyr); David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress's
Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2495 (1998) (noting broad agreement that
the Suspension Clause "guarantees judicial review of federal executive detention").
316 It might be argued that since the statute of the ICJ provides that judgments are
binding only as to the parties and with respect to the particular case, see Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1055, 1062, T.S. 993,
there is no violation of "equal treatment" norms in not extending the reasoning of the
Avenajudgment to others-but this is a thin and formalist conception of equality and the
rule of law. The ICJ, by contrast, sought to promote the even-handed application of the
legal rule it articulated. See Avena, 43 I.L.M. 581, supra note 18, at 622, para. 151
("[W]hile . . . the Court has stated concerns [of] the Mexican nationals whose cases have
been brought before it by Mexico, the Court has been addressing the issues of principle
raised in the course of the present proceedings from the viewpoint of the general applica-
tion of the Vienna Convention, and there can be no question of making an a contrario
argument in respect of any of the Court's findings in the present Judgment. In other
words, the fact that in this case the Court's ruling has concerned only Mexican nationals
cannot be taken to imply that the conclusions reached by it in the present Judgment do
not apply to other foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United
States.").
317 See supra note 19.
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state, not federal, courts will decide-the greater the risk of executive
manipulation of the writ.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: ON HABEAS CORPUS, INDEPENDENT JUDGING,
AND INTERNATIONAL. JUDGMENTS
Habeas corpus cases have played an important role in rebuffing
presidential claims of unlimited presidential power, or of what some
call "lawless enclaves," 3181 in dealing with alleged enemy combatants.
Rasul and Hamdi were in important measures a vindication of Kutner's
vision of habeas corpus: Suspected terrorists and aliens, held by a pow-
erful nation, received access to a court through invocation of the an-
cient writ. Pride in the availability of corrective process and in the
independence of the courts from executive power was vividly present
in these opinions.3 1 9
But the occasional use of habeas corpus to actually hear the claim
of one held at the behest of the executive branch should not be al-
lowed to obscure the substantial power of the executive branch to
constrain the range of reasoned and reasonable decisions for a court
to make.3 2°1 The President's determination in Medellin has arguably
presented the courts with a conundrum, in which either compliance
318 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343)
(argument of John J. Gibbons for Petitioners), available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/oral-arguments/argumentstranscripts/03-334.pdf (arguing that the government's as-
sertion that it was "immune from judicial examination" when it detained foreign nationals
outside the United States would "create a lawless enclave insulating the executive branch
from any judicial scrutiny now or in the future").
'319 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("It is
during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's commitment to
due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our
commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad."); id. at 545 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The defining character of American constitutional
government is its constant tension between security and liberty, serving both by partial
helpings of each. In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a rea-
sonable degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in be-
tween) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose particular
responsibility is to maintain security."); Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473-74 ("Habeas corpus is ... 'a
writ antecedent to statute,... throwing its root deep into the genius of our common law.'
The writ appeared in English law several centuries ago, became 'an integral part of our
common-law heritage' by the time the Colonies achieved independence, and received
explicit recognition in the Constitution .... Consistent with the historic purpose of the
writ, this Court has recognized the federal courts' power to review applications for habeas
relief in a wide variety of cases involving Executive detention, in wartime as well as in times
of peace." (citations omitted).
320 In response to expansive arguments for executive branch power, Hamdi, it should
be remembered, in important respects approved a significant expansion of presidential
power to detain. See supra note 264. And the procedural due process requirements the
Hamdi Court derived from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), do not approach giving
the detainee the equivalent of a criminal trial. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34 (plural-
ity opinion) (stating that in the hearings required by due process, "exigencies" may permit
the use of hearsay or a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government's evidence).
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or resistance poses a threat to the rule of law and the position of the
courts. Perhaps the President's assertion of his own prerogative to
decide, based on the foreign policy interests of the United States, how
to comply with the ICJjudgment by remitting the challengers to state
courts will be met by an equivalent move by the judiciary: to assert a
power to review the legality of the President's determination, but ulti-
mately to acquiesce in it. Such an approach, if the courts adopt it,
could provide opportunities for a hearing on the merits of their
claims for Medellin and the other persons named in the Avenajudg-
ment. But whether it advances the rule of law, the role of habeas, or
the independence of the courts remains to be seen.
Independent judgment on the legality of detention is an essential
component to any rule-of-law system. Independent judgment may be
obtained in many ways. Kutner's idea, impracticable as it may have
been, was to find independence from the judgments of national gov-
ernments through an international tribunal. In the United States, our
tradition identifies independence with the courts, and particularly
with the federal courts protected by Article III tenure and salary provi-
sions. While there is considerable disagreement over the role of
courts (for example, in resolving redistributive questions of economic
and social welfare), there is little question that an individualized hear-
ing before an impartial adjudicator is essential to the protection of
liberty. 32 1 Independence of judgment may be particularly important
when those detained are regarded as enemies, in order to resist the
natural prejudices and passions of the moment. Whether through in-
ternational adjudication or domestic courts, a key point is that review
by an independent decision-maker be available. Kutner saw this in
the case of William Oatis; the U.S. Supreme Court saw it in Hamdi;
and we in the legal community need to continue to insist upon it.
But the most independent judge will find it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to serve the functions of the Great Writ if the positive law of her
jurisdiction plainly forbids it: Judges are supposed to be independent,
not from law, but from political pressures, in order to serve the law.
Within the United States, the constitutional status of the writ of
habeas corpus affords an interpretive space for U.S. judges to take a
critical posture, even on positive statutes-or claims of executive
321 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537-38 (plurality opinion) (holding that military inter-
rogators did not meet the requirement for a "neutral" adjudicator of enemy combatant
status, and stating, "'[O]ne is entitled as a matter of due process of law to an adjudicator
who is not in a situation which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judge .. .which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true,"' quoting
Concrete Pipe Prods. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 617-18
(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (holding
that due process requires an impartial judge, not one with a financial stake in the defen-
dant's conviction).
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power-that seek to cabin its use. 322 This constitutional space has
been preserved, though not used, in recent years in Felker v. Turpin,323
in which the Court interpreted the AEDPA to preserve the Supreme
Court's own jurisdiction to hear and grant relief on original writs of
habeas corpus.324 Without disagreeing with the highly restrictive new
positive law limiting habeas relief to challenge state court convictions,
the Court maintained the possibility of judicial review. 3 25
International law, or even the nonbinding judgments of an inter-
national court, can provide other sources of critical distance. If the
very purpose of habeas corpus relief is to ensure that a judge can say
no to the most powerful body in society on behalf of law and liberty,
the judge's own "community of judgment" plays an important sus-
taining role.326 Awareness of the views of a different or broader com-
munity of judges concerned with similar questions of liberty and fair
treatment may provide helpful perspective, and "critical distance," on
the interpretation of our own domestic law when domestic judges are
asked to exercise their judgment against the will of a powerful
executive. 327
Today the United States sits in judgment on the lives of many
foreign nationals, some convicted of heinous crimes in this country,
322 On the importance of interpretive space to judicial independence, see Kim Lane
Scheppele, Declarations of Independence. Judicial Reactions to Political Pressure, in JUDILIAL INDE-
PENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS 227 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002).
323 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
324 See id. at 654, 658-63 (construing AEDPA not to preclude the Supreme Court's
entertaining an original petition for habeas corpus and concluding "that the availability of
such relief in this Court obviates any claim by petitioner under the Exceptions Clause of
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution, and that the operative provisions of the Act do not
violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 9"). The Court in Felker had
"ordered briefing on ... whether application of the [AEDPA] suspended the writ of habeas
corpus in this case," thereby suggesting that the Suspension Clause might provide some
basis for invalidating federal legislation restricting habeas corpus. See id. at 658; cf Ex parte
Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 88 (1868) (affirming the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review
the denial of habeas corpus in the lower courts despite Congress's repeal of one avenue of
appellate review). The Felker Court also concluded, however, that the restrictions on the
lower courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction would "inform our authority to grant such relief as
well . . . [w]hether or not we are bound by these restrictions." Felker, 518 U.S. at 662-63.
And the Court upheld new limitations on successive petitions, concluding they did not
amount to a suspension of the writ. See id. at 664.
325 Whether this is a good or bad thing for liberty and the rule of law is debatable. If
the interpretive space is only an illusion, the Court's action may be seen merely as a device
to strengthen the political legitimacy of the restrictive statute by holding out the false hope
that it will be ameliorated (through interpretation in light of the Constitution, for exam-
ple) in extreme cases. On the other hand, uncertainty may play some role in restraining
public officials, who cannot be sure that relief will be unavailable, and the interpretive
space might be understood as dormant, rather than illusory.
326 See Jennifer Nedelsky, Communities of Judgment and Human Rights, I THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN L. 245 (2000).
327 Cf id. at 273-75, 277 (exploring how some are able to judge against their commu-
nities); Scheppele, supra note 322, at 245 (discussing "critical distance").
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some held for trial, some held for deportation, and some held as en-
emy combatants. But the world grows smaller, and the pace of U.S.
citizens traveling abroad increases; it is predictable that U.S. citizens
will be held in foreign countries, which will sit in judgment on
them.328 All countries have an interest in the procedures used by
others to determine cause for detention, and the procedures of the
most powerful are more likely to influence procedures of the less pow-
erful. For reasons of self-interest, then, the United States should not
be eager to shut out or ignore the multiple sources of law that seek to
protect against unjust or wrongful detentions. We have in the past
benefited from the spur to end racial segregation provided by interna-
tional developments, even if some of our actions were driven by inter-
ests rather than by principle. 329 And we have in the past taken
national pride in leading the world in procedural respect for lib-
erty.330 Whatever the formal legal doctrine that emerges at the end of
the day in Medellin, we should acknowledge the possibility that critical
evaluations in multiple fora-whether binding or not331-may offer
added protection for the independence of judging, of law, and of
liberty.
What those who emerged from the end of World War II saw was
the capacity of even the most apparently "civilized" of nations to en-
gage in barbarous, inhumane, degrading, and evil conduct-on a
massive scale-if unchecked by the possibilities for external interven-
tion, independentjudging under law, or aroused public opinion. And
recent experience suggests that communities beyond our own borders
will be concerned with and capable of responding to how the United
States treats those over whom it exercises physical coercive power, and
that our own behavior will contribute to the standards that may be
applied by other nations to their own and to our citizens. Adherence
to the rule of law and fair process for the protection of liberty may not
be the luxuries so many, in this country and abroad, now seem to
think they are, but instead essential requisites to the possibilities for a
more peaceful and orderly world-as Luis Kutner, in his optimistic
328 See Neuman, supra note 240, at 87 ("In a world of massive international trade,
travel, communication, and cooperative law enforcement, the effective enjoyment of liber-
ties often depends on the overlapping laws of several countries.").
329 See DUDZIAK, supra note 162, at 79-114.
330 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 489-90 (1966) (arguing that the United
States should provide at least as much protection against abusive interrogation as countries
like England, India, or Ceylon provided, in light of our constitutional commitment to Fifth
Amendment rights).
"31' Cf Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT'L L.
409 (2003) (discussing different styles of judicial reasoning, one based on dialogue, the
other on enforcement); Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 249, at 1046-52 (noting the bene-
fits of dialogue between more "utopian" federal courts and more "pragmatic" state courts
over constitutional criminal procedure rights).
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advocacy of the mid-twentieth century, believed. If all the world is not
yet ready for habeas corpus review, let us hope that those countries in
which it has been established do not retreat from their commitments
to fair process, judicial independence and the rule of law.
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